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“IF YOU KNEW HIM LIKE I DID, 
YOU’D HAVE SHOT HIM, TOO . . .” 
A SURVEY OF ALASKA’S LAW OF 
SELF-DEFENSE 
JAMES FAYETTE* 
Self-defense is one of the most powerful defense tools in Alaska’s 
criminal law.  It has the potential for broad application, it involves 
numerous substantive and procedural nuances, and it implicates 
many of the fundamental policies of the criminal justice system.  
Moreover, Alaska’s law of self-defense has recently undergone 
major revisions, making a survey of its principles both important 
and timely.  This Article seeks to provide a descriptive overview of 
the statutes, cases, and policies that form the framework of 
Alaska’s self-defense law.  It is organized around the litigation 
process and describes the important aspects of a self-defense claim 
both before and during trial.  Drawing on his experience in 
litigating self-defense cases in Alaska, the author offers practical 
summations and explanations that will help illuminate self-defense 
principles for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges alike. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence and street crime prosecution are the bread-
and-butter of any Alaska prosecutor’s or public defender’s office.  
Consequentially, self-defense principles haunt the Alaska criminal 
bar’s daily practice. However, litigants and judges are often ill-
prepared to contend with the unique substantive and evidentiary 
issues that every self-defense trial raises.  This Article seeks to aid 
the criminal bar by providing a practical overview of Alaska’s law 
of self-defense. 
Part II discusses the statutory framework of self-defense, and 
Part III discusses several procedural aspects of the self-defense 
doctrine.  Part IV addresses the most essential and commonly-
litigated aspects of a self-defense claim.  Part V provides an 
overview of the use of prior bad acts and reputation evidence, both 
for the defendant and the victim.  Part VI examines four statutory 
justification defenses closely related to self-defense. 
This survey is intended to be a practitioner’s guide, and, as 
such, it provides commentary on recent legislative trends and 
includes citations to jury instructions and unpublished opinions.1  
Aside from a few practical suggestions, no normative argument is 
 
 1. The Alaska Court of Appeals has held that litigants may cite unpublished 
opinions for “whatever persuasive power” the opinion may hold, but not as 
binding precedent.  McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) 
(interpreting ALASKA R. APP. P. 214).  The unpublished opinions discussed herein 
are offered in that light. 
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presented.2  While this survey was originally written by a 
prosecutor for prosecutors, and retains a prosecutorial focus, there 
is much authority of use to defenders here.  Thus, this survey is 
offered to the entire Alaska criminal bar prosecutors and 
defenders alike in the spirit that all our criminal jury work will 
benefit. 
II.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
In Alaska, self-defense is a justification defense, and as such it 
provides a complete defense to all crimes involving the use of 
force.3  Alaska’s current self-defense statutes were enacted by the 
1978 Alaska legislature.4  Since their effective date, Alaska’s two 
basic self-defense statutes have been substantively amended only 
twice—in 2004 and 2006.5  The statutory framework establishes 
when the use of both non-deadly and deadly force is justified and 
also sets forward which party will have the burden of proof at trial. 
A. The Use of Non-deadly Force 
Alaska’s self-defense statute provides that a defendant “is 
justified in using non-deadly force . . . to the extent the person 
reasonably believes that force is necessary for self-defense against 
what the person reasonably believes to be unlawful force” applied 
against him.6  However, a person may not use force if the 
defendant: (a) provoked the conflict with the intention of injuring 
the victim, (b) was engaged in mutual combat, (c) was the first 
aggressor, or (d) was using a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument to act in revenge or to further a felony objective.7  The 
first three restrictions (mutual combat, provocation, first aggressor) 
do not apply “if that person has withdrawn from the encounter and 
effectively communicated the withdrawal to the other person, but 
 
 2. Any opinions that are expressed in this Article are those of the author.  
This Article is not an expression of the policy of the Criminal Division of the State 
of Alaska, Department of Law. 
 3. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330–.335 (2004), amended by Act effective 
Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws; see also Savok v. State, No. A-
5669, 1996 WL 33686458, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996) (“self-defense [is] 
a complete defense to criminal responsibility . . .”). 
 4. Act effective 1978, ch. 166, § 10, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified at 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330–.335 (2004)). 
 5. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws; Act 
effective July 1, 2004, ch. 124, § 17, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 6. § 11.81.330(a). 
 7. Id. 
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the other person persists in continuing the incident by the use of 
unlawful force.”8 
Alaska’s non-deadly self-defense statute includes ten 
important limitations.  Five concepts are found in the statute’s first 
clause, and five are found in the second clause.  The statute’s first 
clause includes the following limiting concepts: the use of excessive 
force, the threat of unlawful and imminent force, as well as 
subjective and objective necessity.9 
For instance, the non-deadly force statute explicitly states that 
the defendant must be reacting to “unlawful force.”10  The 
requirement of an “imminent” threat is inherent in the statutory 
definition of “force.”11  The statute’s “when and to the extent” 
clause implicitly embodies the concept that force may not be 
excessive.12  However, the “reasonably believes” clause is the heart 
of the self-defense statute.13  This clause embodies two important 
tests: subjective and objective necessity.14  The subjective prong 
asks the jury to assess why the defendant believed he should use 
force against his victim.15  In other words, what was the defendant 
actually thinking?  If the defendant used force because he thought 
it was necessary to avoid injury to himself, then the defendant may 
have a self-defense claim.16  On the other hand, if the defendant 
was motivated by anger, rage, jealousy, intoxication, or his own 
violent nature, then he may not.17 
Next, the jury must assess whether the defendant’s conduct 
was objectively necessary.  The objective standard is “whether a 
reasonable person would have acted in self-defense under the 
circumstances.”18  “[T]he law holds a defendant to a standard of 
 
 8. § 11.81.330(b). 
 9. § 11.81.330(a). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(27) (2005), amended by Act effective 
Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 12. See § 11.81.330(a); see also State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 971, 978 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1994). 
 13. This phrase is repeated twice in Alaska’s non-deadly force statute, see § 
11.81.330(a), and once again in its deadly force statute, see § 11.81.335. 
 14. Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1122. 
 17. See Ambrose v. State, No. A-5112, 1996 WL 341743, at *3 (Alaska Ct. 
App. May 22, 1996) (affirming the defendant’s conviction in a judge-tried case 
where the judge concluded that the defendant killed out of anger, not fear). 
 18. Weston, 682 P.2d at 1121. 
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fully reasonable conduct in the context of self-defense. . . .”19  If the 
defendant’s conduct does not fall within the range of conduct 
which the jury is prepared to justify, then the defendant may be 
convicted—no matter what his subjective motivation.20  Thus, every 
self-defense trial asks the jury to place the “reasonable man” in the 
defendant’s shoes and to engage in an after-the-fact assessment of 
the reasonableness of his use of force.21 
The statute’s second clause includes five important instances 
when a defendant may not claim self-defense.22  The first three are 
when the force was the product of mutual combat, when the 
defendant provoked the conflict with the intent to injure his victim, 
and when the defendant was the first aggressor.23  The 2004 Alaska 
legislature provided a fourth exception: a person may not claim 
self-defense if the force used was the result of using a deadly 
weapon24 or in commission of a felony criminal objective25 or by a 
 
 19. Savok v. State, No. A-5669, 1996 WL 33686458, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Feb. 21, 1996) (describing self-defense as “a complete defense to criminal 
responsibility”). 
 20. See Weston, 682 P.2d at 1121. 
 21. See id. 
 22. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.  No Alaska case has addressed whether 
the jury must unanimously agree on which of these five propositions the 
prosecution has disproved beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, there is 
persuasive authority suggesting that the jury need not do so.  See State v. James, 
698 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Alaska 1985).  In James, the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
jurors need not reach unanimous agreement on the particular theory of the 
offense by which the defendant violated a criminal statute.  Id. (“Alaska Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 31(a) should be interpreted to require only that a jury be 
unanimous in its conclusion that the defendant committed a single offense 
described in the statute.”).  The court reasoned that “requiring semantic 
uniformity [would] encourage overcomplicated instructions and hung juries in 
cases in which the jurors actually agree upon the defendant’s guilt . . . .”  Id.  It 
would follow that a jury need not unanimously agree on why a defendant’s self-
defense claim fails. 
 23. §§ 11.81.330(a)(1)–(3). 
 24. The 2006 Alaska Legislature expanded this exclusion to include 
“dangerous instruments.”  Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska 
Sess. Laws. 
 25. The exception applies if the force was the result of “any felony criminal 
objective” of the person, whether the person acted alone or with others.  § 
11.81.330(a)(4)(A).  The statute was drafted in this manner to avoid the problems 
associated with proving formal “gang” activity.  See Bill Review Letter from 
Gregg  D. Renkes, Attorney Gen. of Alaska, to Frank Murkowski, Governor of 
Alaska (June 10, 2004). 
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participant in a controlled substances offense.26  The 2006 Alaska 
Legislature enacted a fifth exception: a person may not claim self-
defense if deadly force was used in retaliation for perceived or 
actual conduct if the defendant (or the person on whose behalf the 
act was committed) has a violent reputation.27  These legislative 
changes were intended to make it more difficult for gang members 
and drug dealers to claim self-defense.28 
B. The Use of Deadly Force 
“Deadly force” is defined as any force that is used under 
circumstances in which the defendant knows or intends to create a 
substantial risk of causing serious physical injury.29  It also includes 
any act that places someone in fear of such injury by means of a 
dangerous instrument.30  Alaska’s self-defense statute provides that 
a person may not use deadly force unless he first satisfies the test 
for the use of non-deadly force.31  Next, the person may only use 
deadly force when and to the extent he reasonably believes it is 
necessary to defend himself against the threat of death, serious 
physical injury, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first or second 
degrees, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, or robbery in 
any degree.32  The deadly force statute also includes an important 
exception: the obligation to retreat.33 
C. The Burden of Proof 
In Alaska, self-defense is classified as a justification “defense” 
that the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.34  It 
is not an “affirmative defense.”35  The difference is that a defendant 
must prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the 
 
 26. § 11.81.330(a)(4). 
 27. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 28. Bill Review Letter from Susan Parkes, Deputy Attorney Gen. of Alaska, 
to Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska (May 9, 2006) [hereinafter Parkes-
Murkowski Letter]. 
 29. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(16) (2005), amended by Act effective Sept. 
14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 30. Id. 
 31. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 32. Id.  The 2006 amendment added sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree 
to this statute.  Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 3, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 33. § 11.81.335(b).  See also infra Part IV.C. 
 34. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.300 (1980). 
 35. Id. 
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evidence.36  Because self-defense is a “defense,” once the defendant 
presents “some evidence” that places self-defense at issue, the 
burden falls upon the prosecution to disprove self-defense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.37 
Self-defense is a complete justification defense to all crimes 
that prohibit the use of force against another person.38 Where the 
defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction, the jury must be 
instructed that the prosecution bears the burden to disprove it.39 
Practitioners (and judges) occasionally flummox the burden of 
proof.  For instance, in Brown v. State,40 the court of appeals held 
that the trial judge committed plain error when, without objection, 
he instructed the jury that self-defense was an affirmative defense.41  
This incorrect allocation of the burden of proof was not remedied 
by another jury instruction that properly, if confusingly, allocated 
the burden to the State.42 
In Owens v. State,43 the defense attorney actually proposed a 
self-defense instruction that erroneously stated that self-defense 
 
 36. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(2) (2005), amended by Act 
effective Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (defining an 
affirmative defense), with § 11.81.900(b)(19) (defining a non-affirmative defense). 
 37. §§ 11.81.900(b)(19)(A)–(B).  In 2003, the administration unsuccessfully 
introduced legislation which would have made self-defense an affirmative defense.  
Bill History, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill.asp?session=23&bill=SB170 
(follow “full text” hyperlink; then follow “SB 170” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 
2006). 
 38. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 39. Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 674 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).  However, even 
if this explicit instruction is negligently omitted, a lawyer’s correct argument on 
this point may cure any defect in the instruction.  O’Brannon v. State, 812 P.2d 
222, 228–29 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Allen v. State, 51 P.3d 949, 959 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2002) (holding a correct argument cured any subtle potential jury instruction 
error); Hall v. State, No. A-6283, 1998 WL 90885, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 4, 
1998) (holding that, while the court’s jury instruction packet did not expressly 
state that self-defense was a complete defense, any error was cured by the lawyer’s 
correct summation); Weaver v. State, No. A-7177, 2000 WL 1350600, at *5 
(Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2000) (holding the failure to include a specific 
instruction regarding the state’s burden to disprove was not plain error because 
the jury received a general instruction which stated that “the burden of proof was 
on the State and that the burden never shifted.”). 
 40. 698 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 41. Id. at 673–75. 
 42. Id. 
 43. No. A-7952, 2002 WL 31831411 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2002). 
01__FAYETTE.DOC 1/10/2007  8:47 AM 
2006] SELF-DEFENSE IN ALASKA 179 
was an affirmative defense.44  The Owens trial judge gave the 
erroneous proposed defense instruction, but the jurors actually 
caught the error (another instruction in their jury packet correctly 
stated that the prosecution bore the burden of disproving self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt).45  Reversal was averted 
because the trial judge clarified the point in response to a jury 
question, and because both attorneys properly allocated the burden 
during summation.46 
The judge may not instruct the jury that “the court has 
determined” that the defendant has successfully presented “some 
evidence” supporting a self-defense instruction.47  The issue of 
“some evidence” is a legal matter for the court, and the judge 
should not instruct the jury about why the court is giving a self-
defense instruction.48  To do so would constitute an intrusion into 
the jury’s function and would be an instruction on an irrelevant 
matter.49 
III.  PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 
There are a number of procedural nuances to self-defense 
litigation.  Three of the most important are: (1) whether or not the 
prosecutor must instruct the grand jury on the potential use of the 
defense, (2) sufficiency of the notice required to be provided by the 
defense to the prosecution, and (3) what instruction, if any, should 
be given if self-defense does not apply to the case. 
A. Instructing the Grand Jury 
Must a prosecutor instruct the grand jury on the potential for a 
self-defense claim?  There are two answers: the legal answer and 
the practical answer.  Legally, a prosecutor is not obligated to 
instruct the grand jury regarding a potential defense, except where 
 
 44. Id. at *2. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; but see Ambrose v. State, No. A-5112, 1995 WL 17220777, at *3 
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1995) (holding that remand was required because the 
judge made ambiguous comments that arguably and incorrectly shifted the burden 
to the defendant). 
 47. Owens, 2002 WL 31831411, at *3; see Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1207 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1996).  Howell dealt with the “heat of passion” defense rather 
than self-defense, but the “some evidence” issues relating to jury instructions 
remain the same. 
 48. Howell, 917 P.2d at 1207. 
 49. Id. 
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such an instruction would “almost surely” result in the grand jury’s 
failure to indict.50 
Therefore, any error or omission in a grand jury instruction on 
this point is probably irrelevant.  In Smith v. State,51 the prosecutor 
gave the grand jury an impromptu, and incomplete, explanation of 
the law of self-defense.52  The court of appeals concluded that this 
error did not require dismissal because the prosecution had no 
obligation to instruct the grand jury on self-defense at all.53 
The court of appeals further noted that it was not error for the 
prosecution to fail to introduce evidence which would have 
supported a self-defense claim.54  In Smith, the defendant gave a 
post-arrest statement that he felt the victim “had a weapon of some 
sort.”55  Because “self-defense was not properly a grand jury issue 
in this case,” the prosecution had no obligation to introduce this 
statement.56 
From a practical perspective, however, it may be advisable to 
bring the issue of self-defense before the grand jury.  Alaska law 
provides that a prosecutor may argue his theory of the case before 
the grand jury, so long as that argument does not exceed the scope 
of permissible trial argument.57  There are two reasons why a 
prosecutor should be completely open with the grand jury, read 
them the self-defense statutes, and then argue why those principles 
do not apply to the matter at hand.  First, doing so would save the 
court from resolving a pre-trial motion.  Second, if a prosecutor is 
unable to convince ten out of eighteen grand jurors that the case 
should be charged with no opposing voice in the courtroom, then 
 
 50. Grant v. State, 621 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (holding that 
Alaska law does not require a prosecutor to instruct the grand jury regarding a 
defense unless failure to consider the defense would “almost surely” have resulted 
in failure to indict); see Delolli v. State, No. A-8263, 2003 WL 22143282, at *4 
(Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2003) (applying the Grant holding to self-defense 
cases); see also Robles v. State, No A-6208, 1998 WL 208814, at *2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 29, 1998) (applying Grant and rejecting a challenge to the indictment 
based on the prosecutor’s failure to instruct the jury on the use of force to make a 
private person’s arrest); cf. Gaona v. State, 630 P.2d 534, 536–37 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1981) (finding no plain error by the trial court because the case against the 
defendant was strong, even though the prosecutor discouraged the grand jury 
from considering self-defense and failed to instruct them on it). 
 51. No. A-5390, 1995 WL 17221231 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1995). 
 52. Id. at *2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at *1. 
 56. Id. at *3. 
 57. Gustafson v. State, 854 P.2d 751, 759 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
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the prosecutor could never hope to prevail at trial with a judge and 
a clever defense lawyer looking over his shoulder. 
B. Notice 
Alaska court rules provide that the defendant must give the 
prosecution notice of his intent to claim statutory 
defenses including self-defense no later than ten days prior to 
trial.58  Failure to do so “shall entitle” the prosecution to a 
continuance, and the prosecutor could request preclusion of the 
defense.59 
A preclusion ruling is rarely given, and judges may be 
skeptical of a prosecutor’s last-minute request for preclusion.60  
Nonetheless, the defense’s failure to file formal notice of self-
defense has important consequences.  A formal claim of self-
defense may change a prosecutor’s voir dire, proposed jury 
instructions, and construction of his case-in-chief.  As discussed in 
Part V, admissibility of evidence establishing the past violent acts 
and violent reputation of either the victim or the defendant is an 
evidentiary issue that should be resolved prior to trial. 
The court of appeals has mentioned defense failure to comply 
with Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c)(5) on several 
occasions, but has never squarely affirmed a trial judge who relied 
on the rule’s “preclusion” clause.  In Rexford v. State61 and Barnett 
v. State,62 trial judges refused requests for self-defense instructions, 
in part because of failure to provide pre-trial notice required by the 
rule.63  However, neither the Rexford court nor the Barnett court 
affirmed the trial judge’s decision for this exclusive reason.64 
C. Instructing the Jury that Self-Defense Does Not Apply 
If the court rules that self-defense does not apply to the case, 
the judge may be tempted to submit the case to the jury without 
mentioning a word about self-defense during jury instructions.  The 
court of appeals, however, has stated that “in a case such as this 
 
 58. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Grady v. State, No. A-6274, 1998 WL 208816, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Apr. 29, 1998) (allowing the defendant to claim self-defense, even though the 
defense provided Rule 16 notice in the middle of the defendant’s testimony rather 
than before trial). 
 61. No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004). 
 62. No. A-7785, 2003 WL 77061 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2003). 
 63. Rexford, 2004 WL 2676430, at *3; Barnett, 2003 WL 77061, at *2. 
 64. Rexford, 2004 WL 2676430, at *5; Barnett, 2003 WL 77061, at *2. 
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where self-defense is presented as a possible defense, there is a 
danger that the jury may consider its own understanding of what 
self-defense is in the absence of an instruction from the court. It 
seems preferable to have the jury correctly instructed.”65 
Therefore, in a case where self-defense may have been 
mentioned during voir dire, and where a judge concludes that no 
self-defense instruction is warranted (perhaps due to the defense’s 
failure to elicit “some evidence” of self-defense), the specter of 
nullification haunts the courtroom.  If the judge does not instruct 
the jury that “self-defense does not apply to the case,” the jury may 
substitute “its own understanding” of what self-defense law is, and 
award the defendant the windfall of acquittal where he is not 
entitled to it.  In the experience of the author, it is best for the 
judge to state affirmatively: “You are instructed as a matter of law 
that the principles relating to the lawful and justified use of self-
defense do not apply to this case.”66 
Of course, some judges may be skeptical about instructing the 
jury on a defense that does not apply.  The best response to such 
skepticism would emphasize three points.  First, Alaska Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 30(b) requires the judge to instruct the jury on 
all matters necessary for the jury’s information regarding their 
verdict.67  Second, while the judge, prosecutor, and defender know 
that self-defense doesn’t legally apply, there is no reason to assume 
that the jury understands that.  Third, given the likely tenor of the 
defense attorney’s voir dire, and the likelihood that jurors form 
their opinion about self-defense issues from popular media, the 
jurors are not only predisposed to think about self-defense, but to 
do so in a legally erroneous way.  Thus, it would be a miscarriage of 
justice if the jury were to substitute its own judgment of what self-
defense might be, and then acquit on the basis of a defense 
that unknown to the jurors the judge has ruled did not apply.  
This type of nullification was the danger that the Folger court 
recognized.68 
Ample Alaska authority supports an instruction removing self-
defense from the jury’s consideration.69 
 
 65. Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 114  n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 66. The author offers this jury instruction based on his personal experience. 
 67. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 30(b). 
 68. Folger, 648 P.2d at 114 n.3. 
 69. See Gilbreath v. Municipality of Anchorage, 773 P.2d 218, 224 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1989) (“[W]here the trial court is not obligated to give an instruction on a 
defense, it is permissible to tell the jury in an instruction that the defense is not 
available; such an instruction does not violate the rule prohibiting directing a 
verdict against a criminal defendant.”); Berge v. State, No. A-7142, 2000 WL 
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IV.  ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT SELF-DEFENSE 
Self-defense litigation poses a number of key questions, 
including: (1) whether the underlying crime is a “force” crime, (2) 
whether the defendant was the first aggressor, (3) whether the 
defendant had a duty to retreat, (4) whether the defendant has 
offered “some evidence” sufficient to merit a self-defense 
instruction, (5) whether the defendant faced an imminent threat, 
(6) whether the defendant feared unlawful force, (7) whether the 
defendant used excessive force, and (8) whether the defendant had 
a subjectively held, objectively reasonable belief in the necessity of 
force.  Each of these questions will be discussed in turn. 
A. Is this a “Force” Crime? 
Self-defense justifies the use of “force.”70  Therefore, self-
defense is not a defense to any crime that does not criminalize the 
use of force.  For instance, self-defense is not a defense to evidence 
tampering, burglary, false report or theft crimes.  Other defenses, 
such as necessity, may apply to such crimes,71 but since these are 
affirmative defenses they carry different burdens of pleading and 
proof.72 
In light of the force crime requirement, the prosecutor’s initial 
charging decision is critical.  A defendant may have a colorable 
self-defense claim to an assault, but self-defense would not be a 
defense, for example, to removing a weapon from a crime scene, 
wiping the blood off it, hiding it, or driving drunk away from the 
scene afterwards.  None of the crimes implicated by that conduct73 
criminalize the use of “force.”  Furthermore, where self-defense is 
litigated, but self-defense principles apply only to certain counts of 
the indictment, the jury should be specifically instructed that the 
 
1058955, at *7–8 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2000) (affirming the trial court’s jury 
instruction that the jury was not to consider self-defense under Gilbreath because 
the defendant stated that he was not presenting a self-defense case). 
 70. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (“A person is justified in using nondeadly 
force . . . .”). 
 71. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(a), at 143 
n.2 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing an example in which B, fleeing from A’s attack, steals 
C’s car: “It is doubtless true that B is justified in taking C’s car, so he is not guilty 
of larceny thereof, but his defense is necessity rather than self-defense.”). 
 72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 73. In this example the crimes would be tampering with physical evidence and 
driving while intoxicated. 
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doctrine of self-defense, if found, constitutes a defense to only 
certain counts of the indictment.74 
Self-defense only justifies the use of force against persons, not 
against objects.75 In the colorful case of McGee v. State,76 the court 
of appeals sided with this traditional view in dicta. McGee found 
his mother having sex with Wesley Alexander.77  After an 
altercation, Alexander told McGee that he would “run [his] punk 
ass over.”78  McGee went outside, found a shovel, and smashed out 
the windows of Alexander’s truck.79  McGee was later charged with 
criminal mischief for damaging someone else’s property.80 
At trial, McGee testified that he damaged the truck in self-
defense to prevent Alexander from attacking him.81  The trial judge 
ruled that self-defense was not a potential defense to the criminal 
mischief charge, but that necessity was.82  The court of appeals 
noted that, consistent with the traditional view, Alaska’s self-
defense statute justifies use of force upon another person, but not 
upon an object.83  The court decided the case on other grounds, 
however, affirming McGee’s conviction because he did not face an 
“imminent” threat of physical injury.84 
B. Was the Defendant the First Aggressor? 
If undisputed evidence establishes that the defendant was the 
initial aggressor, the court may properly deny a self-defense 
instruction.85  It is a “well-established rule of law” that an aggressor 
cannot claim self-defense unless he has begun an encounter with 
 
 74. See Baker v. State, No. A-5198, 1995 WL 17220761, at *3 n.3 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 5, 1995) (“Because the defense of self-defense relates to the fourth-
degree assault charge, the court’s failure to instruct on self-defense could have had 
no effect on the jury’s verdict on the burglary charge.”); Caldwell v. State, No. A-
3333, 1991 WL 11259199, at *3 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. July 31, 1991) (holding that, 
while the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s self-defense claim to the 
charge of assault, the “self-defense claim has no bearing on the charge of criminal 
mischief”). 
 75. McGee v. State, 95 P.3d 945, 947 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 76. 95 P.3d 945 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 77. Id. at 946. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 946–47. 
 83. Id. at 947 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 71, at 143). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970) (citing 4 WARREN ON 
HOMICIDE § 338 (perm. ed. 1938)). 
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non-deadly force but is met with deadly force, or if he has 
effectively withdrawn from the encounter and the initial “victim” 
continues the assault.86 
According to Judge Singleton, “[u]nder this court’s view, only 
the person who fires the first shot, strikes the first blow, or speaks 
the first insult can be deemed an initial aggressor . . . .”87  The 
supreme court set forth the rationale for this rule in the following 
way: 
We are satisfied that in a day of increasing resort to violence 
these are salutary rules indeed.  The law of self-defense is 
designed to afford protection to one who is beset by an aggressor 
and confronted by a necessity not of his own making.  It must 
not be so perverted as to justify a homicide which occurs in the 
course of a dispute provoked by the defendant at a time when he 
knows or ought reasonably to know that the encounter will 
result in mortal combat. 
. . . . 
. . . The law cannot give its sanction to the settling of disputes by 
the use of deadly weapons.88 
The identity of the initial aggressor usually presents a classic jury 
issue.89  As such, a variety of cases are offered below to illustrate 
whether a defendant’s actions make him the first aggressor.90 
In its most obvious incarnation, individuals committing violent 
felonies are usually deemed to be the first aggressor.91  In Rhames 
 
 86. Castillo v. State, 614 P.2d 756, 766 (Alaska 1980). 
 87. Klumb v. State, 712 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (Singleton J., 
concurring and dissenting).  Judge Singleton then criticized this rule as being 
unnecessarily narrow.  See id. 
 88. Bangs v. State, 608 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980) (quoting State v. Millett, 273 
A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971)). 
 89. Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 90. Two important cases, McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 501–02 (Alaska 
1980), and Bangs v. State, 608 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980), also bear on whether the 
defendant was the first aggressor.  See infra Part IV.D.3.b. 
 91. See, e.g., Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 651 (Alaska 1980); Krantz v. 
State, No. A-1831, 1989 WL 1594942, at *1–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1989).  
Krantz was convicted of third-degree assault for entering an apartment and 
brandishing a shotgun at the occupants.  Krantz, 1989 WL 1594942, at *1.  Krantz 
testified that he had been previously threatened by a man named “Michael,” and 
he mistakenly thought that Michael lived in the apartment.  Id.  In fact, Michael 
did not live there and Krantz’s assault was aimed at two innocent bystanders.  Id.  
The court of appeals rejected Krantz’s theory of self-defense because he had 
armed himself and openly brandished the shotgun upon entering the apartment.  
Id. at *3–4.  The court of appeals distinguished Klumb and Brown, noting that 
neither Klumb nor Brown brandished his weapon until confronted.  Id. at *4.  
“Nothing in Klumb or Brown suggests that an individual is entitled to openly carry 
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v. State,92 the court of appeals held that Rhames was not entitled to 
a self-defense instruction where he was clearly the first aggressor.93  
Rhames, upon hearing that his estranged wife Carrie had obtained 
a restraining order against him, drove to the apartment Carrie was 
visiting.94  Upon seeing Rhames, Carrie retrieved a .22 caliber pistol 
and gave it to the apartment owner, Patrick.95  While outside, 
Rhames retrieved a .38 caliber revolver and fired at the 
apartment.96  He then broke into the apartment through the 
window, fired four more shots at Carrie and Patrick, and then 
struck Patrick repeatedly with the revolver when it failed, before 
finally escaping.97  Rhames argued that he should have been 
provided with a jury instruction of self-defense because he 
conceivably could have seen Carrie hand Patrick the gun, making 
Rhames think he had to defend himself.98  The court of appeals 
upheld the ruling of the superior court, finding that because 
Rhames was the initial aggressor, self-defense was not an available 
defense for his actions.99 
The defendant may be the first aggressor even if he is 
responding to the victim’s somewhat confrontational act.  In 
Desjardins v. State,100 the defendant was driving a pickup truck and 
passed some hitchhikers without stopping.101  One of the 
hitchhikers kicked his truck, which prompted Desjardins to stop 
and pursue the hitchhikers on foot.102  An affray followed, and the 
victim was struck with an implement, resulting in a skull fracture 
and brain injury that caused death.103  Police later found an iron rod 
in the back of the defendant’s truck.104  Desjardins testified that he 
struggled with the victim but denied striking him with the iron 
rod.105  The trial court denied Desjardins’s request for a self-defense 
 
a firearm to a hostile confrontation in order to prospectively discourage assaultive 
conduct by a potential rival.”  Id. at *4. 
 92. 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 93. Id. at 25–26. 
 94. Id. at 23. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 23–24. 
 98. Id. at 25. 
 99. Id.  The court also reasoned that he unquestionably could have retreated.  
Id. at 26.  See also infra Part IV.C. 
 100. 551 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1976). 
 101. Id. at 183. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 183–84. 
 104. Id. at 184. 
 105. Id. 
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instruction: “There is no indication that Desjardins acted in self-
defense; [the victim] did not make an aggressive move toward him 
but instead fled, until he was knocked down.”106  Because there was 
no evidence that the victim offered resistance, Desjardins was not 
entitled to a self-defense instruction.107 
Even where the defendant is reacting to racial taunts, he may 
still be the first aggressor.  In Logan v. State,108 the defendant, who 
was African-American, was on a team that lost a summer 
basketball game to several white men.109  One of the victors taunted 
Logan with racial insults, such as “you guys got schooled by a 
bunch of white boys.”110  Logan punched the taunter in the face, 
making the first physical contact.111  Another member of the white 
team, Sherburne, jumped in, grabbed Logan, and pulled him to the 
ground.112  Bystanders broke up the fight and asked Logan to leave, 
but Logan instead retrieved a gun from his car.113  He returned to 
the group, pointed the gun at Sherburne, and asked him how it 
would feel to be shot.114  Then Sherburne’s friend, Waterson, 
rushed Logan and tried to tackle him.115  In the struggle, Logan shot 
Waterson twice, killing him.116  Logan argued self-defense at trial, 
but the trial judge ruled that Logan was not entitled to a self-
defense instruction because Logan was the initial aggressor “under 
everyone’s version of [the] confrontation” and because he had not 
communicated his withdrawal from the encounter.117  The court of 
appeals affirmed.118 
 
 106. Id. at 189. 
 107. Id. 
 108. No. A-8447, 2004 WL 1837674 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2004). 
 109. Id. at *1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at *3.  See also ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(b) (2004), amended by Act 
effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.  Logan is one of the 
few Alaska “withdrawal” opinions.  The court of appeals surveyed sister state 
cases and noted that these cases have held that where the defendant points a gun 
at a victim and then lowers it, or backs off (as if to retreat) but keeps the gun 
trained on the victim, he has not “effectively communicated withdrawal” so as to 
be entitled to a self-defense instruction.  Logan, 2004 WL 1837674, at *5.  Another 
rare “withdrawal” case is Robinson v. City & Borough of Juneau, No. A-4171, 
1992 WL 12153229 (Alaska Ct. App. July 22, 1992).  Robinson was prosecuted for 
throwing a snowball at another man without provocation and then, a few minutes 
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On the other hand, even defendants who start out with illegal 
intent may be entitled to a self-defense instruction.  In Toomey v. 
State,119 the defendant was thrown out of a bar, and then stole a car 
that was idling in the parking lot, went to his brother’s house to 
retrieve a gun, and came back to the bar.120  When he arrived in the 
parking lot, the car owner and two friends confronted Toomey, one 
of them brandishing a pool cue.121 Toomey pointed the gun at the 
man, told him to “hold it,” jumped in the car, and drove away.122  
He was arrested forty-five minutes later, asleep in a restaurant 
parking lot.123  Toomey was charged with robbery, and he argued 
self-defense at trial.124  The supreme court held that Toomey was 
entitled to have his jury instructed on self-defense because a 
reasonable juror could have concluded that Toomey had 
abandoned his illegal intent when he took the car for a second 
time.125  The court reasoned that a juror could have concluded that 
Toomey felt reasonable fear of attack by the group.126  Thus, a 
badly split supreme court (three-to-two, with three opinions from 
 
later, punching him.  Id. at *1.  The victim was the fiancé of Robinson’s former 
girlfriend.  Id.  At trial, Robinson argued that he had withdrawn from his 
unprovoked initial snowball assault and that he was entitled to punch the victim in 
self-defense after the victim aggressively rose to approach him.  Id.  The defense 
proposed an instruction on “withdrawal” which tracked the statutory language of 
section 11.81.330(b).  Id.  The trial judge denied the request.  Id.  Instead, the 
court instructed the jury that the defendant “was the initial aggressor,” and was 
therefore disqualified from claiming self-defense at all.  Id.  The court of appeals 
reversed, citing Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).  Robinson, 
1992 WL 12153229, at *2. 
 118. The court also reasoned that Logan was not entitled to a self-defense 
instruction because Waterson’s use of force was “lawful.”  Logan, 2004 WL 
1837674, at *6.  Because Logan had committed a felony assault upon Sherburne 
(pointing the gun at him), Waterson was authorized to use force against Logan to 
keep him from leaving.  Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.390 (1978) (allowing 
the use of force to make a private person’s arrest).  Therefore, Logan did not 
reasonably perceive the use of “unlawful” force against him, as required by 
section 11.81.330(a).  Logan, 2004 WL 12153229, at *6. 
 119. 581 P.2d 1124 (Alaska 1978). 
 120. Id. at 1125. 
 121. Id. at 1125–26. 
 122. Id. at 1126. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1127. 
 126. Id. at 1126. 
01__FAYETTE.DOC 1/10/2007  8:47 AM 
2006] SELF-DEFENSE IN ALASKA 189 
five judges) held that even car thieves may be entitled to assert 
self-defense.127 
C. Did the Defendant Have a Duty to Retreat? 
Alaska’s deadly force statute requires individuals to retreat in 
certain circumstances.128  Before the 2006 amendment, only peace 
officers and the owners of premises were exempt from the duty to 
retreat.129  Others were required to retreat only if they could do so 
with “complete safety” to themselves and to others.130  In 2006, the 
Alaska legislature expanded the exemption, including all residents 
of the premises where the force was used, the owner’s or resident’s 
 
 127. Id. at 1124.  Toomey’s outcome would almost certainly have been different 
under the current statute.  Toomey would now be disqualified from a self-defense 
instruction because he used a deadly weapon to further his felony criminal 
objective (felony vehicle theft).  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a)(4)(A) (2004), 
amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.  
Toomey is one of the relatively few Alaska self-defense cases where the result has 
been changed by the 2004 and 2006 legislative reforms.  Caldwell v. State, No. A-
3333, 1991 WL 11259199 (Alaska Ct. App. July 31, 1991), is another case in which 
the defendant would have been denied a self-defense instruction under post-2004 
Alaska law.  Caldwell attacked the man who owned the storage lot from which he 
stole an ATV.  Id. at *1.  Caldwell’s theft would constitute felony vehicle theft 
under post-1996 Alaska law.  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.360(a)(1) (2001).  
Accordingly, Caldwell would now be precluded from asserting self-defense by 
section 11.81.330(a)(4)(A). 
 128. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(b) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.  In Rhames v. State, 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1995), the court also based its refusal to grant a self-defense instruction 
on the defendant’s failure to retreat: “Even assuming that Rhames looked through 
the window and saw Patrick holding the .22 pistol, the fact remains that Rhames 
proceeded to break into the apartment.  Rhames suggests no reason why he could 
not have avoided the encounter by simply refraining from breaking into the 
apartment and, instead, driving away.”  Id. at 26. 
 129. See § 11.81.335(b). 
 130. Id.  For an example of a pre-2006 result that has been changed by the 
amendment, see Stapleton v. State, 696 P.2d 180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).  In 
Stapleton, the defendant shot a hotel desk clerk in the office area of a hotel where 
he was a long-term tenant.  Id. at 181.  While Stapleton was a resident of the hotel, 
he did not “own or lease” the office area itself.  Id. at 184.  Therefore, the court 
held that the jury was properly instructed that he had a duty to retreat before 
resorting to deadly force.  Id.  Under Alaska’s post-2006 statute, however, 
Stapleton would have had no duty to retreat.  See S.B. 200, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 
(Alaska 2006) (enacted) (residents have no duty to retreat). 
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guests or agents, and all employees in the building where they 
work.131 
Several jury instructions can be gleaned from one of the most 
interesting of Alaska’s duty-to-retreat cases, Halton v. State.132  
Halton and his victim, Rogers, had been antagonists for about a 
year, harassing each other on various occasions.133  Halton decided 
to arm himself with a handgun, and purposely sought out Rogers.134  
During the confrontation, Rogers shot at Halton, missed, and ran 
away.135  Halton chased Rogers and returned fire, and Rogers’s gun 
jammed when he attempted to shoot at Halton again.136  Halton 
then shot Rogers a second time from long-distance, and once 
Halton caught up with him, the two men wrestled.137  Eventually, 
Halton stood over Rogers and shot him a final time.138  Rogers died 
from the gunshot wounds.139 
 
 131. S.B. 200, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (enacted). The 2006 
amendment dealt with what was referred to as the “castle doctrine”—as in “a man 
should be able to defend his castle.”  See Parkes-Murkowski Letter, supra note 28.  
Of course, existing Alaska law provided, and continues to provide, a separate 
statutory justification defense to those in control of premises who use force to 
defend themselves against burglary and criminal trespasses.  ALASKA STAT. § 
11.81.350(c) (1978), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, §§ 5–6, 2006 
Alaska Sess. Laws.  The 2006 legislation amended this statute only by expressly 
adding “guests” to persons who claim the benefit of the statute, yet the legislature 
watered down the “duty to retreat” clause by expanding the list of persons 
exempted. S.B. 200, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (enacted).  This 2006 
legislative amendment was sponsored by the National Rifle Association.  See 
Parkes-Murkowski Letter, supra note 28.  Although this election-year legislation 
was probably intended to vindicate the rights of lawful gun owners, some 
members of the Alaska legal community have already noted the possibility of 
unintended consequences, as seen in an Anchorage Daily News editorial: “Indeed, 
the more liberal self-defense proposal is welcome news for criminal defense 
attorneys.  Informed of the general thrust of the bill, Anchorage criminal defense 
attorney Rex Lamont Butler said, half-jokingly, ‘That’s huge.  When can they sign 
it? . . . I’m not sure about the wisdom of it, but it certainly is going to make it 
easier as a criminal defense attorney to defend certain cases.’” Editorial, Fire 
Away if Threatened, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2006, at B4. 
 132. No. A-6379, 1998 WL 208815 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1998). 
 133. Id. at *1. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at *2. 
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In response to an interesting series of questions posed by the 
jury members,140 the trial judge instructed the jury: 
A person may not use deadly force if he knows that he can with 
complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of 
doing so by retreating.141 
Even if he has been shot at[,] a person may not use deadly force 
if he knows that he can retreat with complete safety to himself. 
He can pursue the shooter if he chooses[,] but [he] may not do so 
using or threatening the use of deadly force . . . . 
When pursuit is allowed, the mere carrying of a handgun while 
in pursuit is not prohibited.  However, the use or threatened use 
of a handgun is deadly force and [is] not permitted unless the 
circumstances ripen into a self-defense situation as defined in the 
instructions. 
Please keep in mind that the duty to retreat and self-defense 
instructions and related definitions are all interconnected.142 
The court of appeals approved of these instructions, concluding 
that “[a] person can not automatically use deadly force while 
pursuing someone who has shot at them.  If they do shoot at their 
fleeing assailant, the shooting must be supported by a reasonable 
fear of imminent serious harm, and there must not have been an 
obvious avenue of safe retreat.”143 
D. Has the Defense Offered “Some Evidence?” 
A defendant must present “some evidence” on each element 
of self-defense.144  Whether the defense has offered “some 
evidence” sufficient to support a jury instruction for self-defense is 
a matter for the trial judge.145  The Alaska Supreme Court has 
defined “some evidence” as “evidence in light of which a 
reasonable juror could have entertained a reasonable doubt” as to 
the element in question.146 
 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. n.2. 
 142. Id. at *2. 
 143. Id. at *4. 
 144. Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 190 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 145. See id. (“[A] trial judge’s obligation to instruct the jury on self-defense 
arises only if there is some evidence tending to prove each element of the 
defense.” (emphasis added)); Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113–14 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1982) (holding that the trial judge erred in determining that there was not 
enough evidence for the self-defense issue to go to the jury). 
 146. LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808, 810 (Alaska 1980).  LaLonde dealt with 
the issue of heat of passion, not self-defense, but the Alaska Court of Appeals 
later cited this language approvingly in a self-defense case.  See Folger, 648 P.2d at 
113. 
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1. “Some Evidence” Generally.  Alaska law is well-settled 
that the issue of “some evidence” is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant and without regard to the incredibility 
or implausibility of the defense evidence.147  As Judge Coats wrote, 
“even a weak or implausible self-defense claim is a question for the 
jury.”148 
When assessing the sufficiency of “some evidence,” the 
credibility of the defense evidence is generally an issue for the jury, 
not the trial judge.149  Once the defendant places self-defense fairly 
in play by satisfying the “some evidence” test, the trial judge may 
not deny the defendant a jury trial by concluding that he does not 
believe his witnesses.150 
This point has been frequently litigated in Alaska.  In Lamont 
v. State,151 for example, an intoxicated defendant pulled a gun on a 
village public safety officer following closely behind the 
defendant.152  The defendant requested, but was denied, a self-
defense instruction at trial.153  The court of appeals reversed the 
trial court’s ruling on the self-defense instruction, holding that even 
the implausible testimony of the defendant, standing alone, was 
sufficient to ground a self-defense claim.154 
 
 147. See Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (“In 
applying the some evidence test [to the heat of passion defense], neither the 
credibility of conflicting witnesses nor the plausibility of the accused’s version is 
considered.  So long as some evidence is presented to support the defense, matters 
of credibility are properly left for the jury.” (quoting LaPierre v. State, 734 P.2d 
997, 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987))); Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 314–15 (Alaska 
1978) (“The judgment of the trial judge as to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
entitled to great weight on appeal, but, since the defendant’s burden is merely to 
raise the issue, any real doubt should be resolved in his favor.” (quoting 
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962))). 
 148. Folger, 648 P.2d at 113. 
 149. Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 776 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he court is not 
called upon to determine the credibility or strength of the evidence or the weight 
to be given to testimony.” (citation omitted)). 
 150. See id. 
 151. 934 P.2d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 152. Id. at 776. 
 153. Id. at 776–77. 
 154. Id. at 778–79; see also Paul, 655 P.2d at 775–76 (“The burden to produce 
some evidence of self-defense is not, however, a heavy one . . . . A jury question 
will be presented and an instruction required if the evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the accused, might arguably lead a juror to entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.”). 
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2. “Some Evidence” May Not Be Based on Sheer Speculation.  
While it is true that the defendant’s “some evidence” burden is not 
heavy, it is equally true that it may not be based on sheer 
speculation and must satisfy all elements of the statutory defense.155  
For instance, in Hilbish v. State,156 the female murder defendant 
argued that the following circumstances supported her request for 
instructions on self-defense and heat of passion: that the victim was 
a male, that he was larger and stronger than she, that he was angry 
with her due to her affair with another man, that the two had 
argued shortly before the murder, that he had threatened her in the 
days before his death, and that his blood was spattered about the 
house.157  Although she did not testify,158 the defendant argued that 
these circumstances grounded the inference of a struggle sufficient 
to entitle her to a self-defense instruction.159  The trial court denied 
the self-defense instruction, and the court of appeals affirmed, 
because Hilbish presented no evidence of the actual use or threat 
of deadly force against her, and no evidence that she had acted 
based upon a reasonable belief in her necessity to use deadly 
force.160  The court of appeals concluded: 
[T]he state was under no obligation to assume the burden of 
disproving self-defense until there was some evidence 
affirmatively suggesting that what might have happened actually 
did happen . . . . 
. . . Allowing the jury to consider self-defense . . . could only have 
invited speculation as to possibilities that find no reasonable 
support in the evidence . . . .161 
Although the lack of evidence supporting the defendant’s claim is 
the key consideration, it is also significant to note that the court of 
appeals seems more likely to affirm the denial of a self-defense 
instruction if the defendant did not actually testify about why he 
used force.162 
3. Cases Where the Defendant was Erroneously Denied a Self-
Defense Instruction.  Although cases like Hilbish demonstrate that 
 
 155. See Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 771 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 156. 891 P.2d 841 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 157. Id. at 851–52. 
 158. Interview with trial prosecutor (Aug. 21, 2006). 
 159. Hilbish, 891 P.2d at 851. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 852. 
 162. See, e.g., id.; Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); 
Frank v. State, No. A-7914, 2003 WL 1987850, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 30, 
2003) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a self-defense instruction in a murder 
trial where the defendant did not testify). 
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sheer speculation is insufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” test, 
this threshold is a relatively low standard, as the following cases 
illustrate.  These cases also show that, as a practical matter, a 
defendant who declines to testify may not provide sufficient 
evidence to support a self-defense instruction (because a testifying 
defendant is more likely to satisfy the “some evidence” test by 
providing direct evidence of his subjective motivation to use 
force).163 
a. Generally.  Only a very small quantum of evidence is 
required to create a question of fact for the jury.164  In Folger v. 
State,165 the defendant testified that he believed he was going to be 
robbed by the physically larger victim, so he took out his knife to 
scare, not stab, the victim (not knowing whether the victim had a 
weapon).166  The court of appeals held that this testimony was 
sufficient to entitle the defendant to a self-defense jury instruction, 
since the “some evidence” test only requires “more than a 
scintilla.”167 To this end, the court explained that “[i]t is obvious 
why a trial judge would be less than impressed with Folger’s 
explanation for his use of a dangerous weapon.  However, Folger 
was entitled to a trial by a jury and a jury should have been 
instructed on his self-defense claim.”168 
The Folger court relied heavily on Christie v. State.169  
Although Christie was an insanity-defense case, practitioners 
should be mindful of the court’s language because Folger is a 
frequently-cited “some evidence” case: 
The subject matter being what it is, there can be no sharp 
quantitative or qualitative definition of “some evidence.”  
Certainly it means more than a scintilla, yet, of course, the 
amount need not be so substantial as to require, if 
uncontroverted, a directed verdict of acquittal.  The judgment of 
the trial judge as to the sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to 
great weight on appeal, but, since the defendant’s burden is 
 
 163. A prosecutor must be mindful that comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest 
silence carries the risk of plain-error reversal.  See Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 768–69 
(approving the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that it was not permitted to 
make an adverse determination about the defendant’s failure to testify); see also 
Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (reserving the issue 
of whether questions about pre-Miranda silence are constitutionally permissible). 
 164. See Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 775–76 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 165. 648 P.2d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 113 (quoting Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 314–15 (Alaska 1978)). 
 168. Id. at 113–14. 
 169. 580 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1978). 
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merely to raise the issue, any real doubt should be resolved in his 
favor.170 
Although the courts themselves sometimes disagree as to the 
precise standard,171 almost any evidence that transcends “sheer 
speculation” will qualify.172 
b. A “Some Evidence” Dilemma.  The “some evidence” 
standard has been applied differently, and perhaps inconsistently, 
in the specific instance where the defendant provokes an argument, 
leaves, and returns armed with a deadly weapon. 
In Bangs v. State,173 the defendant Bangs started a verbal 
altercation with a neighbor, Troyer.174  The argument got out of 
hand, and Troyer ended up choking Bangs and screaming, “Don’t 
be fucking with me, I’m a killer . . . .”175  Bangs left, armed himself 
with a gun, returned to confront Troyer, and pointed the weapon at 
Troyer.176  Troyer jumped down from the bed of a dump truck and 
lunged at Bangs, and Bangs fired, killing Troyer.177  Bangs testified 
that he fired because he felt Troyer would overpower and kill 
 
 170. Id. at 314–15 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. 
Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted)). 
 171. See, e.g., Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1984).  In Weston, the 
defendant and the sixty year-old male victim engaged in an argument over money 
to pay for alcohol at the victim’s home.  Id. at 1120.  Weston testified that the 
victim pulled a knife on him and, in the struggle that ensued, Weston eventually 
gained control of the knife and slashed the victim’s throat, killing him.  Id.  
Weston requested a self-defense instruction, which the trial judge denied.  Id. at 
1121.  The supreme court reversed, holding that the defendant’s testimony 
provided “some evidence” regarding both the subjective (he must have believed 
force was necessary) and objective (the belief must have been reasonable) self-
defense test.  Id. at 1122.  The court noted that the victim was intoxicated (with a 
blood alcohol level of 0.269 percent), had attacked the defendant with a knife, and 
had access to guns nearby in the room during the struggle.  Id.  Justice Compton’s 
vigorous dissent pointed out that Weston had control of the knife and could have 
secured possession of the firearms or could have dragged “him [the victim] across 
the street to the police station.”  Id. at 1124 (Compton, J., dissenting). 
 172. See, e.g., Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“The burden 
to produce some evidence of self-defense is not, however, a heavy one; this 
standard is satisfied when self-defense has fairly been called into issue.”); Cano v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, No. A-8441, 2004 WL 1737591, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Aug. 4, 2004) (“[T]his burden [to produce evidence in support of a self-defense 
claim] is not a heavy one.”) (citations omitted). 
 173. 608 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1980). 
 174. Id. at 2. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 2–3. 
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him.178  Bangs’s trial defense counsel requested an instruction that 
Bangs was not required to retreat, which the trial court denied.179  
The supreme court affirmed, ruling that failure to give the 
requested “no-duty-to-retreat” instruction was not error, because 
Bangs was not even entitled to a self-defense instruction.180  The 
court explained that “[t]he law of self-defense is designed to afford 
protection to one who is beset by an aggressor and confronted by 
necessity not of his own making.”181  Bangs, however, had set into 
motion the events that led to the crime, and was therefore not 
entitled to claim self-defense.182 
In a similar case, McMahan v. State,183 the defendant had lived 
with his former girlfriend.184  A few days after an argument which 
resulted in McMahan moving out, the girlfriend introduced him to 
her new boyfriend, the victim.185  The victim told McMahan to stay 
away, and told McMahan that he “[had] a new rifle and I wouldn’t 
want to use it . . . on you.”186  McMahan left and armed himself 
before returning to his former girlfriend’s apartment, later claiming 
that “[it would] be foolish to go back up there if I wasn’t able to 
defend myself.”187  After returning to the apartment and kicking 
open the door, McMahan shot and killed the victim.188  He later 
testified that the victim “came at him with a knife.”189  The supreme 
court held that McMahan was not entitled to a self-defense 
instruction.190  Following the reasoning from Bangs, the court 
explained that “when a defendant has a prior grievance with the 
deceased and takes a deadly weapon to an encounter with the 
deceased, the defendant should be deemed to have provoked the 
violence which resulted in the death,” and thus be precluded from 
bringing a self-defense instruction.191 
 
 178. Id. at 3. 
 179. Id. at 5. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971)). 
 182. Id. 
 183. 617 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1980). 
 184. Id. at 501. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 495. 
 189. Id. at 501. 
 190. Id. at 501–02. 
 191. Id. at 502. 
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Bangs and McMahan stand in sharp contrast with two later 
court of appeals decisions.  In Brown v. State,192 the defendant 
argued with the victim, who the defendant found at his wife’s 
home.193  Brown and the victim both left the home, but Brown 
armed himself with a .22 caliber rifle and sought out the victim, 
allegedly intending only to talk to him.194  Brown testified that 
during the course of the conversation the victim leveled a .44 
magnum at him.195  Brown testified that he fired at the victim just 
before the victim fired at him.196  The court of appeals held that 
even weak self-defense cases satisfy the “some evidence” test, and 
that the factual implausibility of the claim is a matter for the jury.197  
Unlike Bangs, the court explained, the evidence here suggested 
that Brown merely wanted to talk to the victim, not harm him.  To 
this end, the crucial inquiry is not “whether [the defendant] was 
armed when he went to meet [the victim]; rather, it is whether his 
assault occurred ‘in the course of a dispute provoked by the 
defendant at a time when he knew or ought reasonably to have 
known that the encounter would result in mortal combat.’”198 
Likewise, in Klumb v. State,199 the defendant had an ongoing 
financial dispute with the victim.200  He armed himself with a 
handgun, because he considered the victim to be potentially 
dangerous, and sought out the victim to “get this thing talked 
out.”201  According to Klumb’s testimony, he confronted the victim 
in his home and the victim pulled out a gun from his waistband.202  
Klumb fired, “not aiming at anything,” but striking the victim in 
the skull.203  He then fired again to “stop his ‘nervous twitching.’”204  
The court of appeals reasoned that the trial judge erroneously 
relied upon McMahan, holding that Klumb was entitled to a self-
 
 192. 698 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 193. Id. at 672. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 674. 
 198. Id. (quoting State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971)) (alterations in 
original). 
 199. 712 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 200. Id. at 910. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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defense instruction because Klumb could not reasonably have 
concluded that arming himself would result in mortal combat.205 
It is very difficult to reconcile Bangs, Brown, McMahan, and 
Klumb.  In each of these four cases, a defendant engaged in a 
confrontation, went away, armed himself, and returned to continue 
the dispute.  Bangs and McMahan hold that the defendant had 
forfeited his right to self-defense.  Klumb and Brown hold the 
contrary.  The dilemma is highlighted by Judge Singleton in his 
Klumb dissent and concurrence, criticizing the Klumb majority for 
“ignor[ing] inconvenient precedents of the Alaska Supreme 
Court.”206  The cases are only reconcilable to the extent that Bangs 
did not testify that his victim confronted him with a weapon, while 
Klumb did.  While McMahan was arguably confronted with deadly 
force (the knife), he was also clearly the first aggressor, had 
invaded another person’s apartment, and unquestionably had a 
duty to retreat.  Brown, like Klumb, testified that he was 
confronted with a deadly weapon and “won the draw.”207 
E. Did the Defendant Face an “Imminent” Threat? 
Alaska’s self-defense statute requires that one must 
reasonably act to defend oneself (or another) against “force.”208  
Alaska’s statutory definition of “force” requires that the threat of 
bodily impact be “imminent.”209  Therefore, if the defendant’s 
proffer does not include a showing of an imminent threat, his 
request for a self-defense instruction will be denied. 
For example, in Grandberry-Williams v. State,210 the defendant 
accelerated his car and spun his wheels in a crowded Anchorage 
parking lot at bar-closing time, throwing up stones from the 
pavement.211  The victim ran after the defendant’s vehicle to tell 
him to stop spinning his wheels, and after an exchange of words, 
Grandberry-Williams “sucker punched” him, dropping him to the 
pavement.212  The prosecution called a third-party witness who 
testified that the victim made no aggressive movement toward 
 
 205. Id. at 911–12. 
 206. Id. at 913 (Singleton, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 207. See Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 208. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330 (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, 
ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 209. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(27) (2005), amended by Act effective 
Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 210. No. A-8384, 2004 WL 178950 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004).  The author 
was the trial prosecutor. 
 211. Id. at *1. 
 212. Id. 
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Grandberry-Williams.213  Grandberry-Williams did not testify.214  
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct on 
self-defense, ruling that mere verbal confrontation about 
aggressive driving in a bar parking lot did not amount to an 
“imminent threat of use of force” against him.215 
1. Preemptive Strikes.  A defendant may not engage in a 
preemptive strike against an anticipated opponent, even if the 
opponent has threatened death or violence against the defendant in 
the past.216  Ha v. State217 is the leading Alaska “preemptive strike” 
case.  Ha and Buu were Dillingham fishermen who had fought on 
the night before the fatal shooting (Buu had inflicted a head injury 
on Ha and had threatened to kill him).218  The next day, twelve to 
thirteen hours after the fight, Ha armed himself with a rifle, stalked 
Buu, and shot him thirteen times, hitting him in the back at least 
seven times.219 
The defense attorney argued that the victim was a member of 
a Vietnamese crime family and that “A threat from Buu . . . was as 
good . . . as a kiss on [the] cheek by a . . . Mafia godfather.”220  The 
defense requested a self-defense instruction, but the trial judge 
denied the request, holding that Ha faced no “imminent” threat.221  
The judge correctly reasoned that the concept of imminence was 
woven into the statutory definition of “force.”222 
The court of appeals held that Alaska law does not permit 
preemptive strikes.  There was no showing of “imminent” harm to 
Ha because “[a] defendant’s reasonable belief that harm will come 
at some future time is not sufficient to support a claim of self-
defense . . . .”223  Because there was no “imminent” threat to Ha, his 
conviction was affirmed.224 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at *5. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 194 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 186–87. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 188 (alteration and third omission in original). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(27) (2005), amended by Act 
effective Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (defining “force”)). 
 223. Id. at 194.  The court also noted that “‘inevitable’ harm is not the same as 
‘imminent’ harm.”  Id. at 191 (finding that harm is inevitable, as opposed to 
imminent, if it is likely to occur at some time after, rather than during, the 
confrontation). 
 224. Id. at 196. 
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Thus, even if a defendant actually and reasonably believes 
that, sooner or later, his enemy will choose an opportune moment 
to attack and kill him, the law does not allow the defendant to seek 
out and kill his enemy.  The defendant’s use of force against his 
enemy is authorized only when the defendant actually and 
reasonably believes that the enemy’s threatened attack is 
imminent.225 
2. “Battered Spouse” Cases.  The requirement of immediacy 
has important application in “battered spouse” cases.  Thirteen 
years before Ha, the court of appeals posited (in dicta) that Alaska 
law would not support a “battered woman” defense where a 
domestic violence victim killed her abuser in a preemptive strike.226  
Typically, these cases involve a battered and fearful wife who kills 
her husband in his sleep.  Despite ample evidence that such a 
killing was motivated by real and urgent fear, such a self-defense 
claim would properly be denied because as long as the husband is 
sleeping there is no immediate threat of harm.227 
The key to the analysis of such “battered spouse” cases is the 
degree to which the defense can establish a present and immediate 
threat at the time the fatal blow was delivered.  Resolution of this 
threshold question will carry portentous evidentiary consequences.  
For instance, where a defendant kills her batterer without an 
immediate threat of harm (in his sleep, for instance), the defense’s 
request for a self-defense instruction would be squarely barred.228  
With self-defense precluded from the jury’s consideration, the jury 
will never hear about the specific acts that grounded the 
defendant’s fear no matter how persuasive or grievous those acts 
may be.229  Nor would the jury hear reputation evidence 
 
 225. Id. at 194; see also Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 778 n.8 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1982); McGee v. State, 95 P.3d 945, 947 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (affirming the 
denial of a self-defense instruction based on the lack of evidence of imminent 
threat). 
 226. Paul, 655 P.2d at 778 n.8. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Ha, 892 P.2d at 194; Paul, 655 P.2d at 778 n.8. 
 229. See Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 651 (Alaska 1980) (holding testimony 
of the victim’s prior acts of violence was inadmissible because there was 
insufficient evidence justifying a self-defense instruction).  In Deacon v. State, No. 
A-4399, 1993 WL 13156808 (Alaska Ct. App. June 23, 1993), the court of appeals 
held that, where the defendant did not testify, called no witnesses, and offered 
evidence that the victim had assaulted the defendant on several prior occasions as 
the only support for his self-defense claim, the evidence was properly excluded.  
Id. at *1–2.  This statement—that reputation evidence is inadmissible if the 
defendant is not entitled to a self-defense instruction—is still valid, but Deacon is 
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establishing the victim’s derogatory reputation for violence.230  Such 
issues could only be heard at sentencing, which is cold comfort for 
the defense.231 
On the other hand, where a battered spouse establishes a 
colorable claim of a present and imminent threat at the time the 
fatal blow was delivered perhaps where the defendant testifies 
that the victim approached aggressively the defense would be 
able to distinguish Ha, Hilbish, and Hamilton.  With self-defense 
fairly in play, the torrent of derogatory evidence establishing the 
decedent as a batterer would be admissible and may be placed 
before the jury. 
F. Did the Defendant Fear “Unlawful” Force? 
To claim self-defense, the defendant must be reacting to 
“unlawful” force.232  A person has no privilege to resist a lawful 
arrest carried out with non-excessive force.233  In Gray v. State,234 
 
a good example of pre-1996 appellate confusion about the purposes for which a 
victim’s prior specific acts are admissible.  After 1996, a victim’s prior specific acts 
are admissible only where the defendant admits to the charged assault, where the 
defendant knew of the prior act, and where they are used to prove that the 
defendant’s use of force was reasonable.  See infra Part V.B.2.  The Deacon court 
noted that the defendant sought to admit the prior specific-act evidence to prove 
the identity of the initial aggressor, 1993 WL 13156808, at *1, a position 
inconsistent with post-1996 Alaska case law, see infra Part V.B.2. 
 230. See Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 351–52 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence was irrelevant and properly 
excluded where the defendant presented no evidence of self-defense); Rexford v. 
State, No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004) 
(excluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts because the defendant was 
not entitled to a self-defense instruction). 
 231. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.155(d)(3), (16) (2005) (allowing a sentence to 
be mitigated if the defendant committed the offense under “duress, coercion, 
threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense” or if the 
assault or homicide was committed “in response to domestic violence”). 
 232. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 233. Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 913–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).  The court 
discussed the legislature’s 1982 repeal of the statute authorizing resistance to 
unlawful arrests: 
Under Miller, citizens having good reason to believe they were being 
unlawfully arrested were nevertheless obliged to submit peaceably to a 
deprivation of their personal liberty and await their day in court. . . . 
[T]he Alaska legislature briefly reinstated the common law rule that 
allowed such battles between officers and private citizens who disputed 
the legality of an arrest.  Soon, however, the legislature re-established 
the rule and policies announced in Miller . . . .  It follows that Jurco was 
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Gray shot and killed a police officer who tried to arrest him as he 
escaped from an armed robbery.235  Gray requested a self-defense 
instruction from the trial court, but this request was refused.236  The 
supreme court affirmed the denial, holding “that appellants 
provoked the difficulty by committing the armed robbery.  
Authority clearly supports . . . and indicates that a person who 
provokes a difficulty thereby forfeits his right to self-defense.”237 
Whether or not the victim’s use of force was “lawful” appears 
to be a legal issue for the court, not a factual one for the jury.238  If 
the court determines that the victim’s use of force was “lawful,” it 
may properly deny a self-defense instruction and remove the issue 
from jury consideration.239 
G. Did the Defendant Use Excessive Force? 
Because defendants are permitted to use force only “when and 
to the extent” necessary, a defendant’s use of force may become 
excessive at some point during an assault.  For instance, while the 
first shot may have been fired in self-defense, the tenth shot may 
not have been.  In State v. Walker,240 the defendant was confronted 
by a hostile group at a party.241  He stabbed one man once in the 
arm, and another man three times once in the neck, and twice in 
the chest.242  The first victim had his bicep severed, and the second 
victim suffered a collapsed lung.243  The jury acquitted the 
defendant of the first stabbing, but convicted him of the second.244  
The court of appeals held that the verdicts were not inconsistent 
because the jury could have concluded that the degree of force 
against the first man was reasonable, whereas the degree of force 
 
not entitled to forcibly resist the State Troopers’ efforts to seize his 
truck . . . . 
Id. 
 234. 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970). 
 235. Id. at 900. 
 236. Id. at 907. 
 237. Id. at 908. 
 238. See, e.g., Logan v. State, No. A-8477, 2004 WL 1837674, at *8 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Aug. 18, 2004). 
 239. See id. at *8–9 (finding the defendant did not reasonably fear “unlawful” 
force, and thus could not claim self-defense, where the defendant was the first 
aggressor and the opponent’s use of force against him was “lawful”). 
 240. 887 P.2d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994). 
 241. Id. at 976. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
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against the second was excessive.245  The court discussed limits upon 
the actual use of force, distinguishing between pointing a gun, 
firing a warning shot in the air, and then actually shooting to kill: 
“Even though a person faces a threat of imminent death or serious 
physical injury, so that he or she is legally entitled to use deadly 
force in self-defense, the law still requires that the force used be no 
greater than necessary to avert the danger.”246 
When faced with an excessive force scenario, a court could 
find useful language in Justice Matthews’ Weston opinion and 
Judge Mannheimer’s Walker opinion, and from these two could 
craft a useful “excessive force” instruction.  One could correctly 
cite both cases for the following proposition: 
A defendant’s claim of self-defense requires that the defendant 
must have actually believed the degree of force used was 
necessary, and this belief must be objectively reasonable.247  A 
basic tenet of the doctrine of self-defense is that use of deadly 
force is unreasonable if non-deadly force is obviously sufficient 
to avert the threatened harm.248  Even in circumstances when a 
person is permitted to use deadly force in self-defense, that 
person may still not be authorized to employ all-out deadly force 
because such extreme force is not necessary to avert the 
danger.249 
H. Did the Defendant Have a Subjectively Held, Objectively 
Reasonable Belief in the Necessity of Using Force? 
A defendant may use force only to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself 
against what he reasonably believes is unlawful force.250  Assuming 
the defense has met the “some evidence” threshold, prosecutors 
must sustain a burden that defense lawyers seldom bear: proof of 
multiple negative propositions beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Nonetheless, a defendant’s actions sometimes provide strong 
evidence that he, in fact, held no sincere, subjective belief in the 
necessity of using force.  The prosecutor should also be aware of 
how objective reasonableness plays out in cases of mental illness 
and intoxication. 
 
 245. Id. at 978. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Weston v. State, 682 P. 2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984). 
 248. Id. at 1124 (Compton, J., dissenting). 
 249. Walker, 887 P.2d at 978. 
 250. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330(a), .335(a) (2004), amended by Act 
effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
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1. Actions that Undermine a Defendant’s Claim to Have a 
Subjective Belief in the Necessity of Using Force.  The prosecutor 
inevitably must rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove that a 
defendant did not subjectively believe in the necessity of his use of 
force.251  Two types of circumstantial evidence may undermine a 
defendant’s claim to have held this belief: (1) when the defendant 
ran from the scene, and (2) when the defendant lied afterward. 
a. The Defendant Ran from the Scene.  Flight from the scene 
of a shooting has been held admissible as inconsistent with self-
defense and probative of consciousness of guilt.252  Such evidence is 
admissible notwithstanding the fact that there were other possible 
explanations for the defendant’s flight.253  Alternative explanations 
are a matter of the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility.254 
This principle is aptly—if theatrically—summed up in Rexford 
v. State,255 a case in which the defendant fled the scene.  The 
prosecutor paraphrased the Bible, saying that “the guilty flees when 
no man pursueth; the righteous stand as bold as a lion.”256  The court 
of appeals held that this argument was not prosecutorial 
misconduct, and did not interject the prosecutor’s personal opinion 
about the defendant’s guilt.257 
b. The Defendant Lied.  Alaska courts frequently admit 
evidence of a false-exculpatory statement as circumstantial 
evidence of guilt, even where there are benign alternative 
explanations.258  Circumstantial evidence of guilt is doubly relevant 
 
 251. Alaska’s pattern jury instructions provide, “State of mind may be proved 
by circumstantial evidence. It rarely can be established by any other means.”  
Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction 1.44 (Criminal), quoted in Sivertsen v. State, 981 
P.2d 564, 566 n.10 (Alaska 1999). 
 252. Dyer v. State, 666 P.2d 438, 448–49 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (“Dyer’s flight 
and elaborate attempts to evade the authorities could be interpreted as evidence 
that he had not shot in self-defense and to show his consciousness of guilt.”). 
 253. Id. at 449. 
 254. Id.; see also Roberts v. State, 453 P.2d 898, 905–06 nn.27–28 (Alaska 1969) 
(holding that the defendant’s flight, efforts to avoid arrest, and possession of a 
firearm unrelated to the offense were all relevant and admissible “under the 
general doctrine which permits a full showing as to flight”). 
 255. No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004). 
 256. Id. at *11–12 (citing Proverbs 28:1). 
 257. Id. at *12. 
 258. See Sakeagak v. State, 952 P.2d 278, 283 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (affirming 
the admission of false exculpatory statements as circumstantial evidence of the 
defendant’s consciousness of guilt); Bloomstrand v. State, 656 P.2d 584, 590 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a jury instruction charging the jury with 
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in a self-defense case, where subjective belief in one’s justified 
actions is an essential element of the defense.259  Thus, a prosecutor 
should be entitled to argue that the defendant did not subjectively 
believe that his use of force was justified if the defendant lied to 
investigators or civilians (this often takes the form of denying that 
he was at the crime scene). 
A prosecutor must be mindful that commenting on a 
defendant’s pre-arrest silence carries the risk of plain-error 
reversal.260  However, where a defendant makes a statement to 
police, does not claim self-defense, and then testifies differently at 
trial, he may be properly questioned about his failure to claim self-
defense when interviewed by police.261 
2. Reasonableness in Cases of Mental Illness and Intoxication.  
The law assesses the “reasonableness” of a defendant’s actions in 
light of a person whose mental abilities are not impaired by mental 
illness or brain damage.262  In other words, there is no such thing as 
a “reasonable” paranoid schizophrenic.  The court of appeals has 
affirmed the following jury instruction: “When these instructions 
use the term ‘reasonable person’ or ‘reasonably believe’[] they 
mean a reasonable, mentally healthy person whose thinking is not 
influenced by mental difficulties that skew or affect his ability to 
 
determining whether the defendant exhibited signs of consciousness of guilt, to be 
done by comparing prior statements made by the defendant and the fact that he 
did not make these statements during the trial while testifying, was a valid jury 
instruction). 
 259. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330, .335 (2004), amended by Act effective 
Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 260. See generally Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).  
Silvernail held that the prosecutor’s questioning of the defendant about his failure 
to claim duress during his initial conversation with police had little probative value 
and was unduly prejudicial, thus violating Alaska Rule of Evidence 403.  Id. at 
1174–75.  It should be noted that the Silvernail court specifically reserved the 
question of whether questions about pre-Miranda silence are constitutionally 
permissible.  Id. at 1175. 
 261. See Joseph v. State, No. A-9055, 2006 WL 1360945, at *22–23 (Alaska Ct. 
App. May 17, 2006) (holding that questioning about pre-trial statements was not 
an improper comment on the defendant’s right to silence because the defendant 
had chosen to break his silence, and the prosecution had the right to question him 
about his inconsistent statements). 
 262. Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 195–96 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
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form reasonable thought processes or to act in a reasonable 
fashion.”263 
Because participants in street crime assaults are often under 
the influence of alcohol or street drugs, defendants who claim self-
defense at trial were often themselves under the influence of 
intoxicants at the time of the charged event.  Regardless, Alaska’s 
self-defense statute holds defendants to the standard of a sober, 
reasonable person.  In Nygren v. State,264 the defendant, while 
drunk, stabbed her husband.265  On appeal, she argued that a 
breathalyzer result, which measured her blood alcohol content 
(0.210% at the time of her arrest) should not have been admitted.266  
The supreme court stated that self-defense requires that “the 
circumstances be such that a reasonable person would believe that 
she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.  The 
focus here is on the circumstances as they would appear to a 
reasonable person.  The intoxication of the appellant is not 
germane to that question.”267 
Thus, the jury instruction for mental illness from Ha may 
logically be adapted for defendants who were intoxicated: “When 
these instructions use the term ‘reasonable person’ or ‘reasonably 
believe,’ they mean a reasonable, sober, mentally healthy person 
whose thinking is not influenced by alcohol or intoxicating drugs 
that skew or affect the ability to form reasonable thought processes 
or to act in a reasonable fashion.”268  This inferential step is 
bolstered by the fact that intoxication is generally voluntary while 
mental illness is not, so a stringent reasonable person standard is 
more likely to be upheld and applied where the defendant 
voluntarily incapacitated himself. 
V.  THE USE OF PRIOR ACTS AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE 
Evidence of reputation and specific prior acts—of both the 
defendant and the victim—can be especially powerful in the minds 
of a jury.  Such evidence can suggest that a person was generally 
peaceful or combative, or had specific reason to be fearful in a 
situation that ultimately lead to the claim of self-defense.  
 
 263. Id. at 197.  The court of appeals took care to mention that, when the trial 
judge inquired about the drafting of the instruction, the prosecutor boldly stated, 
“I wrote it last night.”  Id. 
 264. 616 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1980). 
 265. Id. at 21–22. 
 266. Id. at 22. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Ha, 892 P.2d at 197. 
01__FAYETTE.DOC 1/10/2007  8:47 AM 
2006] SELF-DEFENSE IN ALASKA 207 
Therefore, an understanding of the rules for admitting prior bad 
acts and reputation evidence is essential to the criminal bar. 
A. The Defendant’s Prior Acts and Reputation 
Four reasons for admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior 
acts and reputation often arise in self-defense trials.  These are: (1) 
to establish combative attitude near the time of the offense, (2) to 
show motive or intent after self-defense has been raised, (3) in 
cases of domestic violence assaults, and (4) to counter the 
defendant’s claimed reputation for peacefulness. 
1. The Defendant’s Prior Acts are Admissible to Show 
Combative Attitude Near the Time of the Charged Offense.  Many 
cases have held that the defendant’s prior acts are relevant to show 
he was combative near the time of the offense.269  For instance, 
Lerchenstein v. State270 concluded that the trial judge “did not abuse 
his discretion in admitting other evidence concerning 
Lerchenstein’s angry and combative behavior immediately prior to 
the shooting incident.”271  The court reasoned: 
In order to establish that Lerchenstein did not act in self-
defense, the state was entitled to rely on evidence indicating 
that, at the time of the shooting, [Lerchenstein] was angry, 
emotionally agitated, and extremely combative—in other words, 
that he was not acting reasonably . . . .  Since this evidence had 
specific relevance beyond its mere tendency to establish a 
propensity toward violence, its admission was not categorically 
precluded by Evidence Rule 404(b).272 
 
 269. See, e.g., Seek v. State, No. A-6098, 1998 WL 80112, at *8–9 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Feb. 25, 1998) (holding that the defendant’s prior threatening statement was 
properly admitted under Rule 404(b)(1) to prove his state of mind at the time of 
the shooting); see also Pitt v. State, No. 6292, 1997 WL 796503, at *2–4 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Dec. 24, 1997) (holding that the court properly admitted evidence of the 
defendant’s aggressive demeanor in the emergency room following a fatal 
stabbing because the evidence was relevant to his state of mind at the time he 
claimed to have acted in self-defense). 
 270. 697 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff’d per curiam, 726 P.2d 546 
(Alaska 1986). 
 271. Id. at 319. 
 272. Id. at 317–18.  Lerchenstein is occasionally cited as authority to exclude 
“prior bad acts” evidence under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) on the 
grounds that other bad acts evidence is inherently prejudicial and presumptively 
inadmissible.  However, this aspect of Lerchenstein—arguably, its core holding—
was specifically overruled by the 1991 Alaska Legislature when it amended Rule 
404(b).  See Act effective Sept. 24, 1991, ch. 79, § 1(c), 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
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Another interesting example is Abuhl v. State.273  Abuhl had an 
argument with his victim about the victim’s cat, Gizmo.274  The 
argument resulted in the victim striking Abuhl with a bat.275  The 
next day, Abuhl fatally stabbed this victim, and tried to microwave 
Gizmo (the cat survived).276  Abuhl was charged with murder and 
animal cruelty.277  Abuhl pled to the animal cruelty charge, but 
defended the murder charge by arguing self-defense and heat of 
passion.278  He then argued that evidence about Gizmo was 
irrelevant.279  The trial judge admitted evidence, including photos, 
of the harm to Gizmo.280  The court of appeals affirmed, noting that 
the evidence refuted Abuhl’s claim that he acted out of temporary 
passion and proved his motive (anger about the cat, rather than 
self-preservation).281 
2. The Defendant’s Prior Acts are Admissible to Show Motive 
or Intent After Self-Defense Has Been Raised.  A classic case 
illustrating this point is Brown v. Municipality.282  Brown was 
charged with shooting a dog.283  The Brown court held that 
evidence that the defendant pursued and fatally shot a dog ten 
months before the charged incident was admissible to prove his 
motive (hatred of dogs) and the utter implausibility of the self-
defense claim.284  The case centered on whether Brown believed it 
was necessary to shoot the dog and if that belief was reasonable.285  
The court reasoned that evidence of the prior shooting was 
probative of Brown’s motive or state of mind (to show that Brown 
acted out of hatred of dogs rather than fear).286  The evidence was 
also probative of Brown’s intent (it showed “the implausibility of 
Brown’s claim that the dog lunged at him” and “establish[ed] that 
his fears, if they existed at all, were unreasonable”).287  Evidence of 
 
 273. No. A-8534, 2004 WL 2020346 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2004). 
 274. Id. at *2. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at *3–4. 
 277. Id. at *4. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at *5. 
 280. Id. at *5–6. 
 281. Id. at *6–7. 
 282. 915 P.2d 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
 283. Id. at 655. 
 284. Id. at 656. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
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the prior incidents was therefore admissible.288  This aspect of 
Brown is consistent with prior Alaska cases.289 
On the other hand, Bass v. State290 demonstrates that such 
admissibility is not unlimited. Bass stabbed a man named Foss 
following an argument about gas money.291  Foss’ friend Powers 
angrily approached Bass, grabbed Bass’ cigarette from his mouth, 
and demanded money.292  Bass pushed Powers back.293  Foss joined 
the affray and punched Bass.294  Bass pulled a folding buck knife 
and stabbed Foss in the heart, killing him.295  At trial, Bass argued 
self-defense.296  The prosecution offered six prior assaultive 
episodes to rebut Bass’ self-defense claim, and the trial judge 
allowed the prosecution to introduce the fact that Bass had been 
convicted of misdemeanor assault five years before the fatal 
stabbing.297  The prosecution offered no facts about the prior 
event.298  Once the court allowed the prosecution to admit the 
assault conviction, the parties reached a stipulation which was read 
to the jury (omitting the facts of the prior case).299  The court of 
 
 288. Id. at 657; see also Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1980) (holding 
that evidence of hostile confrontations at shotgun-point with trespassers upon 
remote property was admissible to rebut accident and self-defense themes).  See 
generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 
5:04, at 8 (1984; rev. 1995); 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5242, at 487–88 (1978). 
 289. See, e.g., Sheakley v. State, 644 P.2d 864, 873–75 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) 
(finding the introduction of previous eye-gouging incidents admissible); Halberg v. 
State, No. A-3733, 1993 WL 13156720 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1993) (holding 
that evidence of a wife’s jealousy was properly admitted to rebut her battered 
woman’s syndrome defense). 
 290. No. A-6669, 1999 WL 11052 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1999). 
 291. Id. at *1. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at *2. 
 297. Id. at *1. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id.  The technique of offering only the bare fact of conviction, and not 
developing the underlying facts, is not sound practice.  The fact of judicial 
conviction, when viewed in the Rule 403 context, is the most prejudicial and least 
enlightening probative aspect of a prior criminal event.  This point is illuminated 
by Calapp v. State, 959 P.2d 385, 387 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).  Calapp was 
prosecuted for second-degree theft after he pawned stolen jewelry.  The most 
significant issue at trial was whether Calapp had recklessly disregarded the fact 
that the pawned jewelry was stolen.  To rebut Calapp’s claim of mistake or 
accident, the trial judge allowed the State to present evidence that Calapp had 
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appeals held that this was error because it constituted evidence of 
prior bad acts barred by Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2).300  The 
court found that the convictions had been used to rebut Bass’ self-
defense claim, whereas Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 limited the parties 
to using reputation and opinion evidence not specific acts as the 
sole method of proving the character of the assailant.301 
3. Domestic Violence Assaults are Generally Admissible.  In 
domestic violence prosecutions, evidence of prior specific acts of 
domestic violence is generally admissible to disprove a claim of 
self-defense.302  One of the most important cases in this regard is 
Ayagarak v. State,303 in which the defendant was charged and tried 
for assaulting his wife.304  The court held that his three prior assaults 
against his wife were admissible to rebut his claim of self-defense 
and to show the nature of their relationship.305  Ayagarak is 
tremendously important for prosecutors because the court held 
that admissibility of prior bad acts is governed by the minimal 
 
previously been convicted of theft and forgery.  The prosecution did not offer the 
facts of the previous cases, merely the bare fact of conviction.  A split court of 
appeals held that evidence of the convictions was improperly admitted because 
the fact of conviction, standing alone, told the jury little or nothing about Calapp’s 
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen.  Id. at 388.  Bass was decided as a Rule 
404(b)(2) case.  In light of Allen, the Bass court’s holding is obviously correct—
specific acts are inadmissible on direct examination under Rule 404(a)(2).  Yet, if 
the Bass prosecution had been able to establish that the facts of the prior 
assaultive events were somewhat similar to the Foss stabbing, it could have relied 
on Adkinson and Brown to make a far more persuasive offer under Rule 
404(b)(1). 
 300. Bass, 1999 WL 11052, at *3. 
 301. Id.  However, the court found that this error was harmless because the 
prosecution did not place emphasis on the prior assault during summation.  Id. at 
*3–4.  The court of appeals did not resolve the State’s claim on appeal that Bass’s 
prior conviction and his other assaultive events may have been admissible for 
alternative, non-propensity reasons, such as demonstrating his state of mind, 
disproving the reasonableness of a self-defense claim, and to show that Bass was 
aware of his own tendency to use excessive force in confrontational situations.  See 
id. 
 302. See Heaps v. State, 30 P.2d 109, 109 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (“As an 
earlier episode of domestic violence, the August incident was admissible under 
Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) to prove that Heaps was the aggressor in November.”); 
see also Akaran v. State, No. A-8690, 2005 WL 1026992, at *5–7 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 4, 2005) (affirming admission of two prior assaults on the same victim to 
rebut a self-defense claim). 
 303. No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003). 
 304. Id. at *1. 
 305. Id. at *6. 
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“conditional relevance” threshold of Alaska Rule of Evidence 
104(b).306  The court specifically rejected a claim that “other acts” 
evidence must be proven by the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence.307 
Plyler v. State308 is another example.  In Plyler, the court held 
that evidence of specific violent conduct in a prior relationship was 
sufficiently similar and related to the present case, a homicide 
stemming from a love triangle, to justify admission of the 
defendant’s prior bizarre and violent behavior under Rule 
404(b)(1).309  Despite the fact that this relationship occurred six to 
eight years prior to the charged murder, there were significant 
similarities between the relationships: “Plyler’s actions within the 
[first] love triangle relationship evidenced a jealous and 
inflammatory reaction to the situation.  The evidence tended to 
establish the state’s theory that Plyler reacted in the same manner 
in his relationship with Faye and Peter Nicely.”310 
4. Countering the Defendant’s Reputation for Peacefulness.  
Where a defendant offers testimony of his own good character, the 
state is allowed to rebut that testimony by introducing 
contradictory character evidence.  In Salud v. State,311 the 
defendant, a Kodiak labor leader, testified that he shot and killed 
another labor organizer during an argument in which the victim 
pulled a .45 handgun on him.312  The defendant affirmatively 
offered testimony that he was “a nice guy,” “a good man,” and was 
“liked by the people.”313  However, the trial court permitted the 
state to rebut his testimony by calling the Kodiak police chief, who 
testified that the defendant had a reputation in Kodiak as being a 
violent person.314  The court of appeals affirmed this use of 
character evidence.315 
In Fuzzard v. State,316 the defendant stabbed two men after a 
barroom brawl.317  He was charged with attempted murder and 
 
 306. Id. at *4 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988)). 
 307. Id. 
 308. No. A-6654, 1999 WL 189660 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999). 
 309. Id. at *3.  Although evidence of prior unrelated assaults was improper, it 
did not require reversal due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. 630 P.2d 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). 
 312. Id. at 1010. 
 313. Id. at 1010–11. 
 314. Id. at 1010. 
 315. Id. at 1011. 
 316. No. A-8023, 2003 WL 21981931 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2003). 
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assault.318  He argued self-defense at trial.319  The prosecutor offered 
evidence from a man with whom Fuzzard shared a jail cell for two 
weeks, ten months after the attack, that Fuzzard was “really 
violent” and that his temper “explodes rapidly.”320  Fuzzard’s 
cellmate also testified that Fuzzard was reputed to be violent.321  
The court of appeals affirmed admission of this testimony, 
specifically ruling that “reputation testimony” could be formed 
after the violent event because a person’s character for violence is 
“more or less permanent” and unlikely to change over time.322 
B. The Victim’s Prior Acts and Reputation 
Prosecutors take their victims in self-defense cases as they find 
them.  In other words, in street crime prosecution, a defense 
investigation will often uncover derogatory victim evidence.  This is 
especially true given modern, online computerized court record 
databases.  May a defendant who claims self-defense throw dirt on 
the victim?  The answer, up to a point, is yes. 
The basic principle governing the introduction of evidence 
regarding the victim’s prior bad acts and reputation in self-defense 
cases is as follows: 
When a defendant argues self-defense, he can introduce 
evidence of his state of mind to show that he used reasonable 
force.  Because the testimony is relevant to show the defendant’s 
state of mind, he can introduce evidence of any specific incidents 
of violence on the part of the victim of which he was aware to 
show that he acted reasonably in self-defense.  The defendant 
can also admit evidence of a victim’s character for violence as 
circumstantial evidence to show that the victim was probably the 
first aggressor.  But to show the victim’s character for violence, 
the defendant cannot introduce specific acts; the defendant is 
limited to reputation and opinion evidence in establishing the 
victim’s character for violence.323 
The court of appeals and the supreme court have stated that this 
principle only applies to cases “where the defendant admits killing 
or assaulting the victim and puts the issue of self-defense fairly into 
 
 317. Id. at *1. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at *2. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. (citing 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE  § 1618, at 595 (Tillers rev. 1983)). 
 323. Northcott v. State, No. A-7057, 2001 WL 1042868, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Sept. 12, 2001); see also McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898–99 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1996). 
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question.”324  Evidence of the victim’s bad character is not relevant 
where the defendant claims accident325 or an alibi.326 
Derogatory victim evidence falls into two categories: (1) 
derogatory reputation-opinion evidence, and (2) specific violent 
acts of which the defendant was aware at the time of the offense.  
Each category of evidence is offered for very specific and very 
different reasons.  Each will be discussed in turn, with specific 
emphasis on the two leading cases in each area: Allen v. State327 and 
McCracken v. State.328  Allen and McCracken are companion cases, 
and it is impossible to understand Alaska’s self-defense law without 
reading both of them closely. 
It should also be noted that before 1996, when the McCracken 
court clarified the point, there was much confusion regarding the 
scope of admissible derogatory-victim evidence.329  Most of the 
 
 324. Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650 (Alaska 1980); see Amarok v. State, 
671 P.2d 882, 883 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the principle applies where 
“the defendant admits the assault, but raises self defense”).  A trial judge should 
exercise discretion under Evidence Rule 611(a) (regarding court control over the 
order of evidence presentation) to restrict evidence of a victim’s specific violent 
acts or violent reputation until such time as the defendant concedes his identity as 
the assailant before the jury.  See Forrest v. State, No. A-3952, 1993 WL 13156497, 
at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the refusal to admit testimony of a 
victim’s prior specific threat against the defendant until the defendant testified). 
 325. Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Alaska 1980); cf. Gottschalk v. State, 
881 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (noting that evidence of a victim’s 
violent character may be admissible if a defendant raises a combined claim of self-
defense and accident).  Of course, a jury would probably view a combined claim of 
self-defense and accident with some skepticism because self-defense contemplates 
deliberate, reasoned behavior with the intentional goal of self-preservation.  A 
prosecutor confronted with a combined claim of self-defense and accident would 
be expected to argue to the jury that people very rarely defend themselves “by 
accident.” 
 326. Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 984 (Alaska 1961). 
 327. 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 328. 914 P.2d 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
 329. For instance, in Seek v. State, No. A-6098, 1998 WL 80112, at *6 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998), the trial court’s decision came before Allen, and the court 
of appeals decision was handed down afterward.  Seek not only describes the 
confusion with great efficacy, but also demonstrates that trial judges before 1996 
recognized and were troubled by the Amarok imprecision.  See id.  The trial judge 
even earned high praise from Judge Mannheimer for his handling of the issue; he 
“demonstrated the highest qualities of a trial judge” by following “his duty to 
apply the law as announced by the appellate court, even though he was convinced 
that the appellate court was wrong.”  Id. at *6 n.3. 
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confusion is owed to Amarok and its progeny.330  As a result, many 
cases decided before 1996 are no longer good law with respect to at 
least part of their holdings.331  However, other parts of these cases 
do remain valid.332  Some confusion also remains from the blurring 
of reputation and specific-act evidence that was commonplace 
before the Alaska Rules of Evidence were codified.  Some aspects 
of these early cases were also overruled by the 1996-97 
clarifications.333  Other aspects remain good law.334  Given both 
 
 330. See generally Amarok v. State, 671 P.2d 882, 883–84 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1983) (containing imprecise language regarding the purpose for which specific 
conduct is admissible and imprecise analysis of which of the victim’s prior bad acts 
the defendant had knowledge). 
 331. E.g., Gottschalk v. State, 881 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that the lower court erred in refusing to admit evidence of specific 
instances of the victim’s conduct while drunk); Noble v. State, No. A-3841, 1992 
WL 12153197, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. July 15, 1992) (positing that evidence of an 
assault was admissible to prove the identity of the initial aggressor); Frank v. 
State, No. A-2995, 1989 WL 1595168, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1989) 
(stating that evidence of prior specific acts was admissible to prove the identity of 
the initial aggressor); see also Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d 965, 971–73 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the exclusion of testimony regarding the victim’s 
prior attempt at rape—of which the defendant was unaware—was erroneous 
because it would have corroborated the defendant’s testimony).  To the extent any 
pre-1996 cases seem to support the admissibility of the opponent’s past specific 
acts of which the defendant was unaware, they are no longer valid in the wake of 
McCracken and Allen. 
 332. E.g., Gottschalk, 881 P.2d at 1145 (holding that the trial court committed 
error when it excluded reputation evidence as circumstantial evidence of the 
identity of the initial aggressor); Noble, 1992 WL 12153197, at *2 (holding that 
where the defendant denied being the attacker, evidence of the victim’s violent 
past attacks were not relevant); Frank, 1989 WL 1595168, at *2 (stating that prior 
specific-act evidence was admissible to prove the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s use of force on the charged occasion). 
 333. E.g., Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Alaska 1980) (holding specific-act 
evidence may have been admissible to prove the identity of the initial aggressor); 
Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1980) (holding that the exclusion of a 
journal which likely contained the victim’s admissions of specific violent acts—
admissions of which the defendant was unaware—was erroneous).  These aspects 
of Byrd and Keith are no longer good law in the wake of McCracken and Allen.  
Keith also held that a defendant who claims self-defense may introduce evidence 
of the victim’s violent character without exposing his own character to scrutiny.  
See Keith, 612 P.2d at 985 n.23.  The 1994 Alaska Legislature changed this by 
amending ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2).  See Act effective July 17, 1994, ch. 116, § 
2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws.  Allen recognized this new result.  Allen, 945 P.2d at 
1236. 
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sources of confusion, prosecutors and defenders alike should 
exercise great care when citing to opinions pre-dating Allen and 
McCracken. 
1. Derogatory Reputation Evidence.  Where a defendant 
argues self-defense and asserts (as he must) that the victim was the 
initial aggressor, the prosecution may introduce evidence that 
establishes the victim’s character for peacefulness or the 
defendant’s character for violence.335  The defendant may do the 
same, introducing evidence of his own peaceful character or the 
victim’s character for violence.336  However, on direct examination, 
this form of evidence is limited to the witness’s opinion of the other 
person’s reputation for violence or peacefulness—specific incidents 
are admissible only on cross-examination.337  However, the 
defendant is not entitled to present evidence of a victim’s 
reputation for violence until the defendant satisfies the “some 
evidence” test338 and concedes his identity as the assailant before 
the jury.339 
Derogatory reputation evidence is offered for a purpose 
usually squarely barred by the evidence rules: to prove that the 
actor behaved in conformance with a character trait for 
peacefulness or violence.340  In the self-defense context, evidence of 
a victim’s reputation for violence or the defendant’s reputation for 
peacefulness is admissible as circumstantial proof of the identity of 
the initial aggressor.341  When attempting to determine the identity 
of the initial aggressor, it does not matter whether the defendant 
was aware of the other person’s reputation for violence or 
peacefulness.342  In other words, a defendant charged with 
assaulting a stranger may introduce derogatory opinion evidence to 
 
 334. E.g., Byrd, 626 P.2d at 1059 (affirming the exclusion of the victim’s prior 
robbery and knifepoint threat because the defendant was unaware they had 
occurred). 
 335. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2). 
 336. Id. 
 337. ALASKA R. EVID. 405(a). 
 338. Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 352–53 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 339. Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650 (Alaska 1980); Amarok v. State, 671 
P.2d 882, 883 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 340. McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
 341. Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).  Derogatory 
reputation evidence is not admissible to prove the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s use of force, but specific-act evidence is.  McCracken, 914 P.2d at 898. 
 342. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 898 (noting that “[the] defendant’s [prior] 
knowledge of the [victim’s character] is immaterial” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Amarok v. State, 671 P.2d 882, 883–84 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983))). 
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establish that his adversary had a reputation for violence among 
the people who knew him.343  This is true because the purpose of 
this evidence “is to circumstantially prove a question of historical 
fact: was the victim the initial aggressor during the encounter 
between the defendant and the victim?”344 
In practice, the issue is most commonly raised where the 
defendant seeks to call a defense witness who will testify that he 
knows the victim and that the victim is reputed to be violent.  This 
testimony, coming from a witness who may have no firsthand 
knowledge of the events at hand, may be admissible but carries 
only slight probative value.345 
On direct examination, derogatory reputation evidence is 
limited to the witness’s opinion of the actor’s reputation for 
violence or peacefulness.346  Inquiry into specific acts is only 
permitted on cross-examination.347  But in the self-defense context, 
where the witness holds a derogatory opinion of the victim’s 
character and is also very likely aware of the victim’s specific bad 
acts, only the most reckless prosecutor would inquire about 
specifics on cross-examination.348 
A useful example is Earl v. State.349  In Earl, the defendant 
stabbed his roommate, Ricker, with a pair of scissors and a knife, 
killing him.350  At Earl’s first trial, his attorney argued that the 
killing was done in self-defense, but Earl did not testify.351  The 
conviction was reversed because of improper introduction of a 
prior assault conviction.352  In his second trial, Earl testified that 
Ricker punched him without provocation and came at him with a 
knife.353  Earl testified that there was a struggle, and he grabbed the 
 
 343. See ALASKA R. EVID. 405(a). 
 344. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 898. 
 345. Galauska v. State, 527 P.2d 459, 467 n.14 (Alaska 1974). 
 346. Allen, 945 P.2d at 1239 (“Evidence Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 allow only 
reputation and opinion evidence to prove the character of the defendant or the 
victim.”). 
 347. Id.; see also ALASKA R. EVID. 405(b). 
 348. In practice, the defense attorney’s direct examination of a derogatory 
opinion witness (testifying to the victim’s violent reputation) should be very brief.  
Likewise, a cautious prosecutor should emphasize this witness’s lack of personal 
knowledge about the case at hand and avoid inquiry into specifics, as any such 
inquiry would probably just elicit damaging facts. 
 349. No. A-7385, 2002 WL 531097 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002). 
 350. Id. at *1. 
 351. Id. at *2. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
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knife and stabbed Ricker.354  Earl defended his second trial on 
grounds of heat of passion rather than self-defense.355 
In support of this defense, Earl offered the testimony of a 
psychiatrist, who testified that Ricker was a paranoid schizophrenic 
who was more likely than others to become violent after drinking 
alcohol or using drugs.356  The trial judge ruled that this testimony 
opened the door for the prosecution to present seven reputation 
witnesses.357 Two witnesses testified that Earl was a 
characteristically violent man and five testified that Ricker had a 
reputation for peacefulness.358 The trial judge ruled that the issue 
was governed by Rule 404(a)(2) and admitted the testimony.359 
The court of appeals held that Rule 404(a)(2) was not 
restricted to self-defense cases.360  By claiming that Ricker was the 
first aggressor, even in the heat of passion context, Earl opened the 
door for opinion and reputation testimony, circumstantially 
establishing the identity of the initial aggressor.361 
a. Allen.  Allen v. State362 is the leading Alaska case on the 
admissibility of reputation evidence for the purpose of establishing 
the identity of the initial aggressor.  In Allen, the defendant was 
charged with murder for the stabbing death of Labat.363  Allen 
alleged that Labat had come to his apartment and threatened 
him.364 Believing his life to be in danger, Allen armed himself with a 
kitchen knife, pursued Labat, and ultimately stabbed him to 
death.365  Allen was charged with first-degree murder and claimed 
self-defense.366 
At trial, the judge allowed the prosecution to present evidence 
of two specific instances of Allen’s past violence to undermine his 
self-defense claim.367  The prosecution offered evidence that Allen 
had been convicted of an assault seven years before the Labat 
 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at *7. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at *8. 
 361. Id. at *7–8. 
 362. 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 363. Id. at 1235. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
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stabbing and that he had attacked a woman with a sword a year 
before the stabbing.368 
The court of appeals reversed Allen’s conviction because this 
evidence was improperly admitted.369  The court held that where a 
party offers evidence of a person’s character under Rule 404(a)(2) 
to prove the identity of the initial aggressor, the party is limited by 
Rule 405(a) to offering only opinion and reputation evidence on 
direct examination: “[I]n criminal cases involving claims of self-
defense, Evidence Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 allow only reputation 
and opinion evidence to prove the character of the defendant or 
the victim.”370  This is the case except on cross-examination, during 
which Rule 405(a) allows evidence of a person’s specific acts.371 
The Rules of Evidence impose such limits because the 
character of the actor is not an “essential element” of the claim of 
self-defense.372  A jury might conclude that Allen was 
characteristically violent and that Labat was characteristically 
peaceful, but acquit Allen based on the facts of the stabbing 
anyway.  Alternatively, a jury could conclude that Allen was 
characteristically violent, but believe that he acted in self-defense.373  
Therefore, neither Allen’s character nor Labat’s character was an 
“essential element” of the defense.374  The court concluded that 
evidence of specific conduct was only admissible on cross-
examination.375 
b. The Victim’s Reputation for Peacefulness.  Under Rule 
404(a)(2), the prosecution may present reputation and opinion 
evidence, establishing the victim’s peaceful character and rebutting 
the defendant’s “evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.”376  
Some defendants have argued that the wording of the rule implies 
that such prosecution evidence is admissible only after the defense 
 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 1243. 
 370. Id. at 1239. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. at 1240. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id.  See ALASKA R. EVID. 405(b) (“In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof 
may also be made of specific instances of conduct.”). 
 375. Allen, 945 P.2d at 1239.  Judge Mannheimer criticized the Amarok court 
for implying that specific-act testimony was admissible to prove the identity of the 
initial aggressor.  Id. at 1241–43.  He explained that, “as occasionally happens 
when courts make pronouncements about matters that are not at issue, we 
misdescribed this area of the law.”  Id. at 1241. 
 376. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2). 
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presents its case-in-chief.377  However, the court of appeals has 
rejected this claim, holding that the trial judge retains considerable 
discretion under Alaska Rule of Evidence 611(a) to control order 
of proof.378  The court of appeals has specifically affirmed admission 
of evidence of the victim’s peaceful character in the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief.379 
Before 1994, Rule 404(a)(2) allowed a defendant in a 
homicide case to introduce evidence of the victim’s character for 
violence without allowing the prosecution to introduce similar 
evidence against the accused.380  The prosecution was limited to 
rebutting the defendant’s evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor by establishing the victim’s character trait for 
peacefulness.381  In 1994, the Alaska Legislature amended this 
aspect of Rule 404(a)(2).382  In its “findings and purpose” section, 
the legislature stated that “in cases of domestic violence and other 
violent crimes in which the defendant claims that the victim was the 
initial aggressor, an amendment is necessary to permit the 
prosecutor to rebut this claim by introducing evidence of the 
defendant’s own past violence.”383 
2. Prior Specific Bad Acts of Which the Defendant was 
Aware.  Admissibility of a victim’s specific bad acts is an entirely 
different matter.  Such evidence is offered to prove that the 
defendant’s use of force was reasonable because the defendant was 
aware of ominous, derogatory facts about his opponent’s history.384  
In other words, the defendant’s argument is: “If you knew him like 
I did, you’d have shot him, too.  And you would have made that first 
shot count. . .” 
The defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of specific 
prior bad acts of which he was aware before the assault to prove 
that they instilled in him a reasonable fear that: (1) he was about to 
be attacked, and (2) he reasonably thought that the degree of force 
 
 377. Herman v. State, No. A-7240, 2000 WL 968238, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. 
July 12, 2000). 
 378. Id.; see also Am. Nat. Watermattress Corp. v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330, 
1339–40 (Alaska 1982). 
 379. Herman, 2000 WL 968238, at *3. 
 380. See Act effective July 17, 1994, ch. 116, § 2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 
(current version at ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2)). 
 381. See Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977, 984–86 (Alaska 1980). 
 382. Act effective July 17, 1994, ch. 116, § 2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 383. § 1. 
 384. McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
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he used was necessary.385  However, specific-act evidence is not 
admissible to prove the identity of the initial aggressor.386  This is 
true because, under Rules 404(b)(1) and 405(a), evidence of a 
person’s specific acts of violence is inadmissible to prove his 
character for violence.387 
Obviously, the relevance of specific-act evidence depends on 
the defendant’s subjective awareness of the victim’s specific past 
conduct.  If the defendant was not aware of the victim’s specific 
acts, those acts could not have affected his decision.388 
When a defendant testifies that he is aware of the prior 
specific bad act, an obvious hearsay issue arises: how did the 
defendant become aware of the specific act?  In all probability, the 
defendant was aware of the act because he was told.  Indeed, in 
street crime prosecution, testimony that the “word on the street” 
was that the victim had committed a particular violent act will 
probably implicate multiple layers of hearsay-within-hearsay. 
Nonetheless, the prosecutor’s hearsay objection should be 
overruled.  “When . . . a defendant offers evidence that he or she 
had previously heard other people speak of the victim’s violent 
acts, this evidence is not ‘hearsay;’ its relevance is not for the truth 
of the matters asserted, but rather the effect of these utterances 
upon the hearer . . . .”389 
The defendant does not necessarily have to take the stand and 
personally testify about his subjective awareness of the victim’s 
prior bad act.  A defendant could, in theory, call a third-party 
witness to testify that he was present when the defendant was told 
by another person of the specific bad act.  He could also call a 
third-party witness to testify that before the confrontation, the 
defendant himself explained why he was afraid of the victim.  None 
of this testimony would be susceptible to a hearsay objection 
 
 385. Id. (“[T]he primary relevance of this [specific-act] evidence is to prove the 
defendant’s state of mind when he or she used deadly force against the victim—in 
particular, the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear that the victim was about to 
attack with deadly force.”). 
 386. See Zuboff v. State, No. A-8692, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 189, at *44–56 
(Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2006) (noting that the trial judge was “probably” correct 
when precluding the defense attorney from arguing that the victim’s prior specific 
violent acts could constitute proof of the identity of the initial aggressor).  The 
author was the trial prosecutor. 
 387. Id. 
 388. See Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1980) (“The reason is 
obvious: one cannot be fearful because of events about which one knows 
nothing.”). 
 389. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 899. 
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because it would not be offered for its truth, but rather to prove the 
defendant’s awareness of his victim’s prior violent acts.390 
a. McCracken.  McCracken v. State is the leading Alaska case 
on the admissibility of specific-act evidence to establish the 
defendant’s reasonable use of force.391  In McCracken, the 
defendant was charged with the murder of Ritchie, his roommate.392  
Ritchie lived with and provided assistance to McCracken, who was 
a paraplegic.393 After an argument about money and housekeeping, 
McCracken hid a gun beside his leg in his wheelchair.394  The two 
men began to argue again, at which point McCracken pulled out 
the gun and shot Ritchie.395 
McCracken took the stand and testified that he shot Ritchie 
because he thought Ritchie was about to attack him.396  McCracken 
wanted to testify about Ritchie’s violent acts that he had personally 
observed, as well as other acts that he did not personally observe, 
but of which he claimed to be aware.397  The trial judge ruled that 
McCracken could testify about his own observations as well as 
about Ritchie’s violent reputation.398  However, the trial judge ruled 
that McCracken could not testify to any violent acts about which 
McCracken had been told by Ritchie or others.399 
Subsequently, the court of appeals held that this ruling was an 
error.400  The court explained that where a defendant claims to be 
aware of specific violent acts in his opponent’s past, this is not 
“character evidence.”401  Rather, it is offered to show that the 
defendant’s resort to force was reasonable.402  Because evidence of 
the victim’s past violence is offered to prove the effect on the 
listener (the defendant), and not to prove the truth of whether or 
not the victim actually committed the past assault, it is not 
hearsay.403 
 
 390. See id. 
 391. Id. at 897–99. 
 392. Id. at 895. 
 393. Id. at 894. 
 394. Id. at 895. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 897. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at 897–98. 
 400. Id. at 898. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 899. 
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The court of appeals explained that the evidence should not be 
excluded as hearsay because “[e]vidence that Ritchie had 
previously told McCracken about his past acts of violence and 
evidence that other people had previously told McCracken about 
Ritchie’s violent propensities were just as relevant to the 
reasonableness of McCracken’s fear as incidents of Ritchie’s 
violent behavior that McCracken had personally observed.”404 
Because the trial judge excluded McCracken’s “most forceful” 
evidence supporting his contention that his use of deadly force was 
reasonable, the court reversed McCracken’s conviction.405 
b. Inadmissible Evidence.  Self-defense litigation will trigger 
admissibility of reputation and specific-act evidence that would 
probably be inadmissible in other criminal trials.  Still, there are 
three broad categories of evidence that is inadmissible even in the 
self-defense context: (1) specific acts of which the defendant was 
unaware, (2) non-violent prior bad acts, and (3) extrinsic specific-
act evidence offered to impeach a Rule 405 reputation witness. 
1) Acts of Which the Defendant was Unaware.  A defendant’s 
right to admit evidence of his opponent’s specific violent acts is 
broad, but not limitless.  The first requirement is that the defendant 
be aware of the specific act.  “[O]ne cannot be fearful because of 
events about which one knows nothing.”406  Several cases illustrate 
this principle.407 
In Grandberry-Williams v. State,408 as discussed above in Part 
IV.E, the defendant spun his wheels in a crowded Anchorage 
parking lot at closing time, throwing up stones.409  The victim ran 
after the defendant’s vehicle to tell the defendant to stop spinning 
his wheels.410  The defendant got out of his car and spoke briefly 
with the victim.411  As the victim turned away, the defendant 
punched him, dropping him to the pavement.412  The victim did not 
 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1980). 
 407. See, e.g., Cytanovich v. State, No. A-6287, 1998 WL 80110, at *3 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998) (affirming exclusion of specific prior violent acts of which 
the defendant was unaware). 
 408. No. A-8384, 2004 WL 178950 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004). 
 409. Id. at *1. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. 
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fight back, but the defendant kicked him in the face several times.413  
The trial judge refused to admit evidence of the victim’s history of 
bar fights because the defendant was unaware of those prior 
specific incidents.414  The court of appeals affirmed, citing Allen and 
Rule 405(a): “Rule 405(a) prevents a party presenting a self-
defense claim from offering evidence of specific acts of violence by 
the victim to prove the victim’s character for violence unless the 
defendant knew of those particular acts.”415 
Where evidence of the opponent’s prior violent acts is 
admissible, courts have suggested that the defendant may not offer 
more detail than he actually knew.  In Seek v. State,416 the defendant 
called third-party witnesses to testify in detail about the victim’s 
prior assaultive conduct.417  Three witnesses gave detailed 
descriptions of these prior incidents, but “[i]t appear[ed] unlikely 
that Seek could have been aware of all of these details; during his 
own testimony, Seek never claimed more than a general knowledge 
that the incidents had occurred.”418  Thus, the court of appeals 
criticized the admission, saying, “By presenting these three 
witnesses, Seek arguably got to present more evidence against 
Christiansen than he was entitled to. . . .” 419 
2) Non-Violent Prior Bad Acts.  Even if a defendant’s 
reputation for violence is admissible, his reputation for committing 
non-violent crimes is not.  Although the distinction between violent 
and non-violent acts is often clear, confusion can arise in cases 
involving drug offenses.  Jackson v. State,420 for instance, suggests 
that past instances of selling cocaine do not constitute violent 
 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. at *4. 
 415. Id.; see also Rexford v. State, No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Nov. 24, 2004) (excluding evidence of the victim’s prior assault conviction, 
history of fights, and a conviction for breaking a prior boyfriend’s car window 
because the defendant was unaware of those prior acts); Johnson v. State, No. A-
7401, 2004 WL 1886468 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2004) (refusing to introduce a 
photograph of a rifle inside the victim’s cabin as evidence that the victim was 
reaching for a gun because the defendant had not seen the gun, nor had he seen 
the victim with any gun for nine years). 
 416. No. A-6098, 1998 WL 80112 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998). 
 417. Id. at *7.  A prosecutor faced with derogatory victim evidence should rely 
upon Byrd and Seek, and therefore should request a pre-trial ruling precluding 
defense evidence from exceeding the scope of the defendant’s actual knowledge. 
 418. Id. n.4. 
 419. Id. 
 420. 750 P.2d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
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acts.421  In Jackson, the self-defense issue was raised in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel context.422  Jackson was convicted 
of murder following a shooting at an after-hours club.423  Jackson 
asserted that his counsel was ineffective, in part for failing to 
present evidence that the victim had a “reputation as a cocaine 
dealer.”424  The trial judge excluded this evidence, and the ruling 
was affirmed because whether the defendant was a cocaine dealer 
was not “relevant to any issue at trial.”425 
3) Extrinsic Specific-Act Evidence Offered to Impeach a Rule 
405 Reputation Witness.  If a party calls a reputation witness to 
testify that a participant in the assault is peaceful or violent, the 
opposing party may attempt to impeach the witness on cross 
examination by inquiring about specific incidents of the victim’s 
conduct.426  However, “the rule does not provide any basis for 
allowing independent proof of specific incidents.”427  In other words, 
when cross examination regarding specific acts under Allen is 
unproductive (and the defendant is subjectively unaware of the 
specific act), the lawyer may be stuck with the answer he receives 
because the trial court retains significant discretion under Rule 403 
to exclude extrinsic evidence.428 
 
 421. Id. at 826. 
 422. Id. at 823. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 826. 
 425. Id.  The Jackson court further held that any evidence about the victim’s 
violent character would not have been admissible to prove the defendant’s state of 
mind.  Id.  It would have been admissible to prove, circumstantially, who may 
have been the first aggressor.  Id.  The court concluded, given other evidence 
presented on this point, that Jackson’s attorney was not ineffective for deciding 
not to present this cumulative evidence.  Id. 
 426. ALASKA R. EVID. 405(a) (“In all cases in which evidence of character or a 
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation in any community or group in which the individual habitually 
associated or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.”). 
 427. Earl v. State, No. A-7385, 2002 WL 531097, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 
10, 2002) (emphasis added).  In Earl, the defendant sought to cross-examine a 
woman who testified that the stabbing victim had a peaceful character.  Id. at *7–
8.  The woman had reportedly claimed that the victim had previously assaulted 
her.  Id. at *8.  On cross-examination, the woman denied the assault had occurred, 
and Earl sought to introduce evidence from two witnesses that she had previously 
claimed the assault had occurred.  Id.  The judge excluded the evidence, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at *8–10. 
 428. See id. at *8–10. 
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c. Cases Excluding the Victim’s Prior Bad Acts Outside the 
Self-Defense Context.  The following cases are not self-defense 
cases, but rather are “other suspect” cases in which the defendant 
claimed a third party was responsible for the crime.  They are 
useful to illustrate proper exclusion of derogatory-victim evidence 
under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). 
Rule 404(b)(1) excludes evidence of specific acts where the 
only purpose of the proof is to demonstrate that the victim acted in 
conformance with a derogatory character trait.  In Malloy v. 
State,429 a murder prosecution, the defense pointed the finger at 
Rundle, the purported “real killer.”430  Malloy was charged with a 
particularly cruel knife killing.431  The defense offered evidence that 
Rundle had assaulted her own son and the family dog in the past 
with knives.432  The trial court excluded the evidence, and the court 
of appeals affirmed the ruling.433  “[T]he only apparent relevance of 
this evidence was to show that Rundle was an assaultive and cruel 
person who liked to inflict wounds with knives.  Thus, the evidence 
was barred by Rule 404(b).”434 
Mere repetition of the same class of crime is also not 
sufficient.  In Jordan v. State,435 the defendant was on trial for 
felony criminal mischief.436  The defense sought to show, but the 
court excluded, evidence that the stolen vehicle passengers who 
gave police statements identifying Jordan as the driver themselves 
had prior joyriding convictions which would have rendered them 
subject to enhanced sentencing had they “truthfully” admitted 
their own guilt.437  The court of appeals affirmed, as “‘more is 
demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the 
same class, such as burglaries or thefts.’  The bare evidence of 
Caldwell’s prior joyriding conviction—all that Jordan offered in 
 
 429. 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 46 P.3d 949 
(Alaska 2002) (involving a sentencing issue).  The author was the trial prosecutor. 
 430. Id. at 1279. 
 431. Id. at 1269. 
 432. Id. at 1278. 
 433. Id. at 1278–79. 
 434. Id. at 1279; see also Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 590 n.35 (Alaska 1999) 
(excluding evidence that a third party “other suspect” had engaged in a 
consensual affair with a fifteen year-old girl a year before the defendant was 
charged with the murder of another teenage girl). 
 435. 895 P.2d 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 436. Id. at 996. 
 437. Id. at 997. 
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this case—was not relevant to the issue of identity apart from its 
tendency to prove propensity.”438 
Superficial similarities between two events are insufficient to 
trigger admissibility.  For instance, in Adams v. State,439 the 
defendant was charged with the murder of a man who was tied up, 
struck on the head, and shot.440  The defendant wanted to introduce 
evidence that the informant who fingered him, who had a prior 
conviction for robbery, was the real killer.441  In that case, the 
“other suspect” struck the victim on the head.442  The court ruled 
that the similarity between the two crimes was insufficient to 
“constitute a ‘signature crime.’”443 
3. Procedural Issues Common to Both Types of Derogatory-
Victim Evidence.  Regardless of which type of derogatory-victim 
evidence the defense offers, the court should exercise reasonable 
control over its order and presentation.444  The court of appeals has 
affirmed a trial judge who limited the defense counsel’s inquiry 
about the victim’s prior violent acts to a pre-approved list of 
leading questions.445  Trial judges should follow this practice and 
“script” such questions outside the presence of the jury.  This is 
essential because a witness, if asked whether he has an opinion 
about the victim’s reputation for violence, is likely to volunteer a 
specific bad act of which the defendant was unaware.  Thus, the 
court should instruct the witness about the permissible limits of his 
answer outside of the jury’s presence. 
Neither specific-act nor derogatory reputation evidence is 
admissible until the defendant satisfies the “some evidence” test 
before the jury.446  Because both prior specific-act and derogatory 
reputation evidence carry the potential for extended testimony 
about events distant in time from the charged assault, a prosecutor 
should file a pre-trial motion in limine and seek a pre-trial hearing 
 
 438. Id. at 999 (quoting VAUGH C. BALL ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE  
§ 190, at 449 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted)). 
 439. 704 P.2d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 440. Id. at 795, 798. 
 441. Id. at 798. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. 
 444. ALASKA R. EVID. 611(a) (court control over mode and order of evidence 
presentation). 
 445. Heaps v. State, 30 P.3d 109, 111–12 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 446. See Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 352–53 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
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to obtain a court order excluding such evidence until the defense 
satisfies the “some evidence” test before the jury.447 
Finally, both types of evidence (derogatory reputation and 
specific-act) are susceptible to exclusion under Rule 403.448 
VI.  STATUTORY JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES CLOSELY RELATED 
TO SELF-DEFENSE 
Four statutory justification defenses are closely related to self-
defense.  They are: (1) the defense of third persons, (2) the use of 
force to terminate a burglary, (3) the use of force against police 
officers, and (4) the use of force to make an arrest. 
 
 447. An example of a case in which the trial judge refused to admit testimony 
of a victim’s prior specific threat against the defendant until the defendant 
testified in support of his self-defense claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, is 
Forrest v. State, No. A-3952, 1993 WL 13156497, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 13, 
1993).  On the other hand, it is not difficult to locate instances where a defendant 
was allowed to introduce derogatory victim-reputation and specific bad act 
evidence, but the court ultimately ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a 
self-defense instruction.  See Norris, 857 P.2d at 352 (excluding reputation 
evidence but allowing the defendant to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior 
specific bad acts even though he presented no evidence of self-defense); Loesche 
v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650–51 (Alaska 1980) (permitting derogatory reputation 
evidence about the victim, while excluding some specific-act testimony, where the 
defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction).  Both Norris and Loesche 
are curious cases, for if the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense 
instruction, the court never should have admitted either specific-act or derogatory 
opinion evidence at all. 
Writing for the 1996 McCracken court, Judge Mannheimer explained the 
danger of erroneous admission of derogatory-victim evidence: 
The superior court was empowered to place reasonable limitations on 
McCracken’s presentation of evidence on this point.  A parade of 
witnesses all asserting that the victim was a violent or vicious person 
might well lead the jurors to reach the conclusion that the victim was 
unworthy of the law’s protection, persuading them to base their verdict 
on emotion rather than the law. 
McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).  The first 
“reasonable limitation” should be one of timing: the court should make a 
threshold finding that the defendant will be entitled to a self-defense instruction 
based on evidence presented to the jury before permitting introduction of 
derogatory-victim evidence.  ALASKA R. EVID. 611(a)(1)–(2) (stating the court 
may exercise control over the order of witnesses and presentation of evidence to 
ensure ascertainment of the truth and to avoid needless consumption of time). 
 448. Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 permits the exclusion of concededly relevant 
evidence on the grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Heaps, 30 P.3d 
at 112; McCracken, 914 P.2d at 899 (regarding “reasonable limitations”). 
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A. Defense of Third Persons 
Alaska law provides that a person may be justified in using 
force to defend a third person.449  When a defendant claims this 
defense, he may use force “when, under the circumstances as [he] 
reasonably believes them to be, the third person would be 
justified” in using that degree of force.450  This defense is subject to 
the same threshold “some evidence” test as would be a defendant’s 
claim of personal self-defense.451 
In David v. State,452 the trial judge denied a requested defense-
of-others jury instruction.453  The defendant testified that he 
believed it was necessary to kick his uncle when he saw him chasing 
his six-year old daughter.454  “I thought he was going to do 
something toward my daughter.  He was chasing her and she was 
pretty scared.”455  David presented evidence that his uncle had 
chased his daughter earlier in the day and that the girl was running 
from the uncle.456  The child testified she was scared.457  The trial 
judge concluded that there was no evidence from which a juror 
could conclude that harm to the child was possible.458  The court of 
appeals disagreed, and reversed David’s conviction.459 
B. The Use of Force to Terminate a Burglary 
Alaska law provides that a person may use non-deadly force to 
terminate a criminal trespass and may use deadly force to 
terminate a burglary in an occupied building.460  The statute 
imposes no “duty to retreat” upon defendants claiming justification 
under this statute.  The 1978 statute provided this justification 
defense only to “persons in control” of premises and their agents,461 
 
 449. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.340 (1978), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, 
ch. 68, § 4, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 450. Id. 
 451. See supra Part IV.D. 
 452. 698 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 453. Id. at 1235–36. 
 454. Id. at 1234–35. 
 455. Id. 
 456. Id. at 1234. 
 457. Id. at 1235. 
 458. Id. at 1236. 
 459. Id. 
 460. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.350(c) (1978), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 
2006, ch. 68, §§ 5–6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 461. Act effective 1978, ch. 166, § 10, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified at 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330–.335 (2004)). 
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but the 2006 legislature expanded this justification defense to their 
guests.462 
Some defense attorneys have sought to expand the definition 
of “building,” with intriguing results.  In Delolli v. State,463 the 
defendant was working as a taxi cab driver.464  A pedestrian asked 
him to deliver a package, but Delolli refused.465  The two argued 
and, according to Delolli’s version of events, the man reached 
through the open driver’s window of the cab, as if to grab Delolli.466  
Delolli opened the door and pushed him away.467  The pedestrian 
fell back.468  Delolli got back into his cab and tried to drive away.469  
As he drove past, the man kicked the cab door sharply.470  Delolli 
stopped the cab, grabbed a sawed-off baseball bat, approached the 
man, and struck him in the head.471 At trial, Delolli testified that he 
acted in self-defense.472  He also argued that his use of force was 
justified to terminate a burglary.473 
Delolli argued, interestingly, that a vehicle adapted for use as 
a place of business (such as a taxi cab) was a “building” within the 
meaning of section 11.81.900, and therefore the victim’s reaching 
through the open window of the cab was a “burglary.”474  The trial 
court instructed the jury on self-defense but denied the instruction 
on use of force to terminate a burglary.475  The court of appeals 
appeared to agree that Delolli’s interpretation of the definition of 
“building” was correct.476  However, because the assault occurred 
outside the cab and after the victim’s “unlawful burglary” was over, 
Delolli was not entitled to an instruction on the use of force to 
terminate a burglary.477 
 
 462. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 5, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 463. No. A-8263, 2003 WL 22143282 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2003).  The 
author was the trial prosecutor. 
 464. Id. at *1. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Id. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. at *5. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. at *7–8. 
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In Palmer v. State,478 Palmer argued with, and then struggled 
with, a man who had entered his trailer.479  He eventually stabbed 
the man.480  At trial, he argued that the struggle acted as an implied 
termination of the victim’s license to be present in the trailer, and 
that his use of deadly force to terminate a burglary in an occupied 
dwelling was therefore authorized by section 11.81.350(c)(2).481  His 
use of deadly force may not have been authorized by section 
11.81.335 because the victim was unarmed, and death or serious 
physical injury was unlikely.482  The court side-stepped the issue, 
holding that there was no evidence that the defendant directed the 
victim to leave the premises, that the victim had threatened the 
defendant, or that the victim attempted to injure the defendant.483  
However, the court called the defense theory a “novel 
argument.”484  The court also found it significant that the defendant 
did not testify.485 
C. The Use of Force Against Police Officers 
Defendants charged with assault upon a police officer or 
resisting arrest occasionally argue some variant of a self-defense 
theme.  A citizen may not use force to resist an arrest by a police 
officer unless the officer uses excessive force or is unrecognizable 
as an officer.486  Nor may a citizen use force to resist a pat-down or 
a lawful investigative stop.487  Finally, a citizen may not resist an 
officer’s intrusion into his home to seize property pursuant to court 
order, even if there is some reason to believe that that the court 
decree was issued illegally.488 
In rare cases, such as Barnett v. State,489 a defendant will argue 
that he acted in self-defense against the arresting officer because he 
 
 478. 770 P.2d 296 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). 
 479. Id. at 297. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. 
 482. See id. at 298. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 427 n.4 (Alaska 1969). 
 487. Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 60 P.3d 199, 202 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2002). 
 488. Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 913–14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Napageak v. 
State, 729 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 489. No. A-7785, 2003 WL 77061 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2003).  The author 
was the trial prosecutor. 
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feared physical harm, even though he knew the arrest was lawful.490  
Regardless, “generalized fear that excessive force might be used 
against him,” coupled with reluctance to be held accountable for 
his crimes, is insufficient to trigger a self-defense jury instruction.491 
The defendant in Barnett was caught by a high school security 
guard stealing car stereos in a high school parking lot.492  As the 
plain-clothes guard approached aggressively, Barnett jumped in his 
car.493  The guard stood in front of the car, and smacked his hand on 
the hood, causing an almost-imperceptible dent.494  Barnett 
accelerated directly at the guard, throwing him up and over the car 
and then to the ground before speeding away.495  The court of 
appeals held that Barnett was not entitled to use force to resist a 
non-excessive force arrest.496  “It was only after Judge Souter 
granted the State’s request to give an instruction that a person had 
a right to use nondeadly force to make an arrest that Barnett 
suggested that he had a right to use self-defense to avoid Nolan’s 
possible use of excessive force on him.”497  The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-
defense.498 
Even in cases where a defendant shows that the force used to 
make an arrest is excessive, the reasonableness of the officer’s 
decision to initiate the arrest is not material.499  In these cases, 
prosecutors should request, by pre-trial motion, that the court 
instruct the jury that the police stop was “lawful.”  The prosecutor 
should simultaneously file a pre-trial motion to preclude a self-
defense instruction. 
 
 490. Id. at *1–2. 
 491. Id. at *2 (“We fail to see that this generalized fear, with nothing more, 
could justify Barnett’s use of a dangerous instrument to resist the arrest.”). 
 492. Id. at *1. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. at *2. 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. at *2–3. 
 499. Jackson v. State, No. A-4382, 1993 WL 13156694, at *5 n.1 (Alaska Ct. 
App. May 26, 1993) (“Under these cases [Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 
1969); Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Carson v. State, 736 
P.2d 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987)], use of force to resist the arrest might have been 
justified if Jackson established that [Trooper] Jimerfield unreasonably used deadly 
force in making the arrest.  To the extent Jackson’s defense might have been 
predicated on a claim of unreasonable use of deadly force by Jimerfield, however, 
the reasonableness of Jimerfield’s initial decision to initiate the arrest would 
simply be immaterial.”). 
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D. The Use of Force to Make an Arrest 
Very rarely, defendants may argue that they used force to 
make a “citizen’s” arrest.  This implicates a different justification 
defense.500  There is a crucial distinction between this justification 
defense and personal self-defense.  Self-defense requires proof that 
the defendant faced imminent assault.501  For a citizen’s arrest, 
however, a person may be entitled to use force to make an arrest 
for a crime that has already concluded, where no threat of 
imminent harm exists.502 
In Barton v. State,503 the defendant was attacked by assailants 
in his home.504  He obtained a handgun and his assailants fled.505  He 
fired a shot at them as they did so, striking one.506  The grand jury 
indicted the assailants and Barton in the same indictment.507  At 
trial, Barton testified that he shot at the assailants to prevent them 
from getting a gun of their own and returning to continue the 
assault.508  The trial judge instructed the jury on self-defense, but 
denied a request to instruct the jury on the use of force to make a 
citizen’s arrest.509  The court of appeals affirmed because Barton 
testified that he shot the men to terminate the attack, not to make 
an arrest.510  Therefore, he was not entitled to an instruction on the 
law of private arrest.511  However, the court noted, “[e]ven without 
the defendant’s testimony, the facts of a case may support a 
reasonable inference that the defendant’s purpose in using force 
was to effect an arrest or terminate an escape.  If so, then the 
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on this defense.”512 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Self-defense is a powerful tool in the hands of the criminal 
defense lawyer.  It offers a complete justification for all crimes 
which prohibit the use of “force” whether the charged offense is 
 
 500. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.390 (1978). 
 501. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330 (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, 
ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. 
 502. § 11.81.390. 
 503. No. A-6971, 1999 WL 189360 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999). 
 504. Id. at *1. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. at *1–2. 
 511. Id. 
 512. Id. at *2. 
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misdemeanor assault or first-degree murder.  Prosecutors face the 
daunting task of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Often, a legitimate defense threat of an extended case 
which “puts the victim on trial” may compel a prosecutor to resolve 
a close case with a favorable plea offer. 
Every self-defense trial compels both the judge and the 
advocates to navigate a complex series of statutes, evidentiary 
concepts, and jury instructions.  Adding to this complexity, both 
the Alaska legislature and the appellate courts have shifted the 
self-defense landscape several times in the past decade.  Therefore, 
when presiding over assault prosecutions where self-defense 
concepts are litigated, trial judges should enforce Alaska’s self-
defense notice and pleading requirements.  Defense attorneys 
should aggressively pursue a course of pre-trial investigation to 
uncover derogatory victim reputation and specific-act evidence. 
Prosecutors should force a pre-trial hearing regarding the scope of 
the defense case by vigorous filing of pre-trial motions in limine.  
Finally, both the bench and bar should be familiar with the 
concepts discussed and the case law surveyed in this Article. 
